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Exclusionary Zoning:
Mount Laurel In New York?
Terry Ricet
I.

Introduction

The Mount Laurel decisions of the New Jersey Supreme
Court, Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel,' constitute the most extreme treatment in the
country of the controversial issue of exclusionary zoning. In spite
of New York's more traditional approach to the question of the
impact of zoning ordinances on housing opportunities, the
Mount Laurel decisions are stimulating increased pressure on
New York courts to react in a manner less deferential to the
traditional presumptive authority of a municipality to formulate
its own land use policies. Although appellate courts in New York
have declined to require that municipalities provide opportunit B.A., College of William and Mary, 1972; J.D., Albany Law School, 1975; Village
Attorney, Village of Suffern, New York; Town Attorney, Town of Tuxedo, New York;
Private Practitioner, Suffern, New York.
copyright 0 1986 Terry Rice All Rights Reserved
1. The first Mount Laurel decision, which will be referred to as Mount Laurel I,
appears at 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975). The second
Mount Laurel decision, which will be referred to as Mount Laurel II, appears at 92 N.J.
158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983).
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ties for the housing of low income individuals, the stage has been
set in New York for an attack on zoning laws and restrictions
which do not provide for the accommodation of housing for
those on the lower stratum of the economic structure or which
displace such people in favor of the more wealthy.
In order to assess the possible impact of the Mount Laurel
decisions on New York law, an understanding of those decisions
is necessary. To ascertain the effectiveness of the mandates of
the New Jersey Supreme Court the methods and procedures utilized by the Mount Laurel trial judges to enforce its obligations
must be reviewed. Lastly, the legislative response to the unpopularity of judicial oversight of municipal zoning is instructive. A
comprehension of the evolutionary process of combating exclusionary zoning in New Jersey is imperative for anyone proposing
a dramatic change in the New York exclusionary zoning law.
II.
A.

New Jersey Background

Mount Laurel I

In Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel,2 the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed decades of deferential treatment of municipal zoning activities and
determined that a developing municipality violated the New
Jersey constitutional mandate that zoning authority be exercised
in furtherance of the general welfare when it excluded housing
for lower income persons. By adopting zoning ordinances that
inhibit housing opportunities for the poor and advance local interests at the expense of the rest of the state's citizens, a municipality utilizes the police power for an unconstitutional purpose.3
The court held that the obligation to exercise zoning authority
in furtherance of the general welfare could not be satisfied
merely by eliminating exclusionary practices. This obligation
could only be satisfied by affording a realistic opportunity for
the construction within its borders of its fair share of the present and prospective regional need for low and moderate income
housing. According to the court, every developing municipality
2. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
3. Id. at 173-79, 336 A.2d 724-26.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss2/1

2

19861

EXCL USIONAR Y ZONING

was required, through its land use regulations, to make realistically possible an "appropriate variety and choice of housing."'
The Mount Laurel I court did not, however, define what
constituted a "developing" municipality, what the relevant "region" consisted of, the manner in which "regional need" was to
be determined, nor how a municipality's "fair share" was to be
calculated. Although the decision constituted a strong policy
statement and an unequivocal condemnation of exclusionary
zoning, the ambiguity of procedures and methods to be employed stimulated both confusion on the part of those municipalities which wished to act in good faith and avoidance in those
which intended to preserve the status quo. The ambiguity of the
court's holding spawned years of litigation in which the court
retreated from its landmark position. The effect of this litigation
was to stimulate avoidance of the mandates of the Mount Laurel I decision. In a subsequent decision, the court determined
that the construction of "least cost" housing was sufficient to
satisfy a municipality's Mount Laurel I obligation, even if low
and moderate income families could not afford to purchase those
units.' The supreme court further held that precise fair share
allocations were not necessary and that the proper inquiry for a
court was whether a municipality was making bona fide efforts
to remove exclusionary barriers. 7 The court also determined that
the Mount Laurel I obligation did not apply to fully developed
single-family residential communities, 8 and that a fully developed community was not required to grant use variances to permit the construction of multi-family housing.9

4. Id. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724.
5. "Least cost" housing was defined as housing built at the least cost possible. Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 512-13, 371 A.2d 1192, 120607 (1977). However, in many cases, "least cost" housing is not inexpensive enough for
lower income occupancy.
6. Id. at 510-17, 371 A.2d at 1206-09.
7. Id. at 499, 371 A.2d at 1200.
8. Pascack Ass'n v. Mayor of Washington, 74 N.J. 470, 485-87, 379 A.2d 6, 13-14
(1977).
9. Fobe Assocs. v. Mayor of Demarest, 74 N.J. 519, 379 A.2d 31 (1977).
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B. Mount Laurel II
Dissatisfied with the Township of Mount Laurel's lack of
progress in meeting the demand for low and moderate income
housing10 and with the "widespread non-compliance with the
constitutional mandate of our original opinion,"" the Supreme
Court of New Jersey determined in Mount Laurel II to use "a
strong judicial hand" to strengthen and clarify its earlier ruling.1 2 Although Mount Laurel I prohibited municipalities from
employing exclusionary zoning policies, Mount Laurel If imposed an affirmative duty on communities to assure that their
fair share of low and moderate income housing would be constructed.18 The Mount Laurel H decision, a consolidation of six
cases involving a spectrum of Mount Laurel I issues, encompassed three and one-half days of oral arguments and twentyfive months of deliberation by the court. The lengthy 216 page
decision is, in part, a result of "the court's efforts to overcome
municipal resistance by explicitly setting forth what should be
done to satisfy the constitutional mandate." 4
The primary basis for the court's extraordinary determination is its perception of the permissible limits of a municipality's
exercise of the police power:
The constitutional power to zone, delegated to the municipalities
subject to legislation, is but one portion of the police power and,
as such, must be exercised for the general welfare. When the exercise of that power by a municipality affects something as fundamental as housing, the general welfare includes more than the

10. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158,
198, 456 A.2d 390, 410 (1983). The court observed that:
After all this time, ten years after the trial court's initial order invalidating its
zoning ordinance, Mount Laurel remains afflicted with a blatantly exclusionary
ordinance. Papered over with studies, rationalized by hired experts, the ordinance
at its core is true to nothing but Mount Laurel's determination to exclude the
poor.

Id.
11. Id. at 199, 456 A.2d at 410.
12. Id.
13. Meisel, Guidelines for the Practitioner:The Impact of Mount Laurel II on New
Jersey Zoning and Planning Procedure and Practice, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 955, 963
(1984).
14. Buchsbaum, No Wrong Without A Remedy: The New Jersey Supreme Court's
Effort to Bar Exclusionary Zoning, 17 URB. LAw. 59, 61 (1985).
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welfare of that municipality and its citizens: It also includes that
of the general welfare -

in this case the housing needs -

of

those residing outside the municipality but within the region that
contributes to the housing demand within the municipality. Municipal land use regulations that conflict with the general welfare
thus defined abuse the police power and are unconstitutional. In
particular, those regulations that do not provide the requisite opportunity for a fair share of the region's needs for low and moderate income housing conflict with the general welfare and violate
the state constitutional requirements of substantive due process
and equal protection. 3
The court stated that the basis for this constitutional obligation
is that "the State controls the use of land, all of the land. In
exercising that control it cannot favor the rich over the poor...
. While the State may not have the ability to eliminate poverty,
it cannot use that condition as the basis for imposing further
disadvantages." 6
The court emphasized what it saw as the imperative for its
obligation to act:
The clarity of the constitutional obligation is seen most simply by
imagining what this state could be like were this claim never to be
recognized and enforced: poor people forever zoned out of substantial areas of the state, not because housing
could not be built
7
for them but because they are not wanted.'
Such a scenario was, in the opinion of the court, not only at variance with the requirement that the zoning power be exercised
for the general welfare, but also with "concepts of fundamental
fairness and decency that underpin many constitutional obligations."' 18 The court declared that the state may not merely authorize municipalities to exercise zoning authority and then disclaim responsibility for problems and consequences which
result.' 9
The court recognized that it was venturing into an area
which "is better left to the Legislature,"' but based this intru15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 208-09, 456 A.2d at 415.
Id. at 209, 456 A.2d at 415.
Id.
Id. at 209-10, 456 A.2d at 415.
Id.
Id. at 212, 456 A.2d at 417.
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sion into the legislative prerogative on its view that the legislature had abrogated its responsibility to protect important constitutional rights. The New Jersey legislature adopted a number of
programs to stimulate or subsidize low income housing and had
entertained fair share allocation legislation, but had declined to
adopt the measure.2 It certainly can be argued that, by basing
its decision on legislative abrogation of responsibility, the court
was stretching its authority to the limit. "Acceptance of this argument [abrogation of legislative responsibility] would validate
judicial policymaking anytime the legislature fails to adopt a
particular program favored by a majority of the court, even
though the program does not have the support of a majority of
the elected members of the state legislature." 2 Regardless of the
implications regarding the judicial legitimacy of its actions, the
court determined that the protection of constitutional rights
could not await the achievement of a political consensus. 3
Having determined the existence of a municipal obligation
to affirmatively provide a realistic opportunity for a fair share of
the region's present and prospective low and moderate income
housing, the court held that satisfaction of a municipality's
Mount Laurel obligation would be determined solely by an objective standard - a municipality would be required to provide
its specific numerical fair share.24 Henceforth, the good or bad
faith of a municipality would be irrelevant, as the court repudiated the numberless "bona fide" standard. The housing in question was required to be affordable to those eligible for section 8
housing programs,2 5 that is, by low income families (those whose

21. See Rose, New Additions to the Lexicon of Exclusionary Zoning Litigation, 14
SETON HALL L. REV. 851, 886 (1984).
22. Id.
The issue is confounded by the fact that there are no due process or equal
protection clauses in the New Jersey Constitution! Nevertheless, the New Jersey
Supreme Court, having determined in Mount Laurel I that there ought to be such
clauses, ruled that those clauses were inherent in the state constitution.
Id. at 865.
23. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 212, 456 A.2d at 417.
24. Id. at 221, 456 A.2d at 421.
25. The term "Section 8 Housing Programs" refers to the Federal Section 8 Housing
Program, Section 8, U.S. Housing Act of 1937, (P.L. 73-479), as amended by Housing
and Community Development of 1974, (P.L. 93-383). The program consists, primarily, of
rent subsidies for lower income families and rehabilitation of substandard housing to
produce adequate housing for such families. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(2) (1937) for the

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss2/1
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incomes do not exceed fifty percent of the median income of the
area) and moderate income families (those whose incomes are no
greater than eighty percent and no less than fifty percent of the
median income of the area). 6 The court delineated affordability
as requiring that a family pay no more than twenty-five percent
of its income for such housing.
In addition to the requirement that certain municipalities
satisfy their fair share of the regional need, all municipal land
use regulations were required to provide a realistic opportunity
for decent housing for its indigenous poor (except where they
represent a disproportionately large segment of the population
as compared with the rest of the region). "The zoning power is
no more abused by keeping out the region's poor than by forcing
out the resident poor."2
In order to determine which municipalities are required to
house the region's poor, the court abandoned the "developing
municipality" standard of Mount Laurel I and embraced the
State Development Guide Plan (SDGP), a state-wide planning
document which divided the state into six areas: growth, limited
growth, agriculture, conservation, pinelands and coastal zones.
"By clearly setting forth the state's policy as to where growth
should be encouraged and discouraged, these maps effectively
serve as a blueprint for implementation of the Mount Laurel
doctrine. 2 9 The Mount Laurel regional fair share obligation applies only to communities located wholly or partly in "growth"
areas.3 0 The intention of the court in utilizing the SDGP was "to

Section 8 definitions of "lower income families" and "very low income families" which
roughly correspond to the Mount Laurel terms "moderate income families" and "low
income families."
26. Id. at 221 n.8, 456 A.2d at 421 n.8.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 214, 456 A.2d at 418.
29. Id. at 226, 456 A.2d at 424.
30. The SDGP is not, however, conclusive in every case. Recognizing that the SDGP
was not specifically prepared for Mount Laurel use, a municipality may, in "unusual"
cases, prove that "the locus of the Mount Laurel obligation is different from that found
in the SDGP." Id. at 240, 456 A.2d at 431. Such a municipality would be required to
demonstrate that the conclusion that the municipality contains a growth area is arbitrary
and capricious, or that the municipality has undergone a significant transformation since
preparation of the map which renders the designation inappropriate. Id. at 240, 456 A.2d
at 431-32. A party seeking to vary the SDGP designations has a "heavy burden." Id. at
215, 456 A.2d at 418.
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channel the entire prospective lower income housing need in
New Jersey into 'growth areas.' "31 As a result, in the view of the
court, the "obligation to encourage lower income housing, therefore, will hereafter depend on rational long-range land use planning (incorporated into the SDGP) rather than upon the sheer
economic forces that have dictated whether a municipality is
'developing.' ,,32
When determining a community's fair share, three issues
must be addressed: the relevant region must be identified, the
present and prospective housing needs must be determined, and
an allocation of those needs among the municipalities involved
must be made. While the decision is not quite as vague as
Mount Laurel I in discussing these issues, it was left to the trial
courts to determine the precise parameters of the relevant region, need and allocation. True to its word, however, the Mount
Laurel H court did provide some guidance in making these determinations. Region was defined to be "that general area which
constitutes, more or less, the housing market area of which the
subject municipality is a part, and from which the prospective
population of the municipality would substantially be drawn, in
the absence of exclusionary zoning. '33 Special circumstances
would be required in order for the trial court to vary the definition. In determining fair share, the court favored formulas which
accord substantial weight to new employment and tax ratables,
while it disfavored formulas that rely upon the effect of past exclusionary practices.
In order to determine these issues and to make fair share
allocations, three judges would hear all Mount Laurel litigation.
It was expected by the court that a regional pattern for each
judge's area and, eventually, for the entire state would emerge,
resulting in a consistent determination of regional needs. The
determination of region and of regional need made by any of the
three judges is to be presumptively valid and binding on all municipalities in the region. The court anticipated that, ultimately,
"fair share" litigation would be limited to the issue of proper

31. Id. at 244, 456 A.2d at
32. Id. at 215, 456 A.2d at
33. Id. at 256, 456 A.2d at
Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 543, 371

433.
418.
440 (quoting Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of
A.2d 1192, 1219 (1977)).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss2/1
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allocation among municipalities.34 "Along with this consistency
will come the predictability needed to give full effect to the
35
Mount Laurel doctrine.
C.

Required Action

To satisfy its Mount Laurel obligations, a municipality
must, at the very least, remove all municipally created barriers
to the construction of its fair share of lower income housing. To
the extent necessary to achieve this, a municipality must remove
all zoning and subdivision restrictions and exactions that are not
necessary to protect the public health and safety. Compliance
with the mandates of Mount Laurel may frequently require
more than the elimination of unnecessary cost producing restrictions, that is, affirmative measures will be required in order to
make housing opportunities realistic. Such measures may include: encouraging or requiring the use of available state or federal subsidies, mandatory set-asides,3 6 and overzoning. Recognizing that "the construction of lower income housing is practically
impossible without some kind of governmental subsidy, '37 a trial
court may require a municipality to cooperate with a developer's
efforts to obtain a subsidy and may require the granting of tax
abatements in appropriate situations.
The court determined that because incentive zoning 8 leaves
a developer free to build only upper income housing if he so
desires, sole reliance on incentive zoning may prove to be insufficient. Mandatory set-asides3 9 are considered by the court to be a
more effective inclusionary device which a municipality must
utilize if it cannot otherwise satisfy its fair share obligation.
Mandatory set-asides are favored by the Mount Laurel court

34. Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 216, 456 A.2d at 419.
35. Id.
36. A mandatory set-aside is a requirement that developers include a minimum
amount of lower income housing in a development. Id. at 266, 456 A.2d at 445.
37. Id. at 263, 456 A.2d at 444.
38. Incentive zoning is "offering economic incentives to a developer through the relaxation of various restrictions of an ordinance (typically density limits) in exchange for
the construction of certain amounts of low and moderate income units." Id. at 266, 456
A.2d at 445. Incentive zoning is commonly accomplished by the use of density bonuses
that increase density as the amount of lower income housing is increased. Id.
39. See supra note 36.
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when subsidies are not available. 40 The court acknowledged the
problem of keeping lower income units available for the poor
over time, that is, the owner or tenant of a unit may be tempted
to rent or sell the unit at its full value. If a municipality is to
satisfy its Mount Laurel obligations, it must ensure that those
units remain available to those for whom they are intended.
There are two methods suggested by the court to ensure availability. First, construction of "no-frills" apartments which would
be sold to low income purchasers at a price close to market value
thereby eliminating the opportunity of sale to higher income
persons, and, second, the use of rent control or covenants and a
public trust to ensure that the units are available only at lower
income levels.
An additional affirmative measure which the court required
a municipality to consider is "overzoning," that is, "zoning to
allow for more than the fair share if it is likely, as it usually is,
that not all of the property made available for lower income
housing will actually result in such housing."' 1 In addition, the
court required that if a municipality has been otherwise unable
to meet its Mount Laurel obligation, it must zone for low-cost
mobile homes:
[W]e do not hold that every municipality must allow the use of
mobile homes as an affirmative device to meet its Mount Laurel
obligation, or that any ordinance that totally excludes mobile
homes is per se invalid ....

[I]f compliance can be just as effec-

tively assured without mobile homes, Mount Laurel does not
command them; if not,42 then assuming a suitable site is available,
they must be allowed.

In the rare instances when special conditions, such as extremely high land costs, make it impossible to otherwise satisfy
a municipality's fair share obligation after all alternatives have
been explored and all affirmative devices considered, "only when
everything has been considered and tried," the Mount Laurel
obligation may be satisfied by the construction of "least-cost"
housing. 43 Although such housing will be unaffordable by those
40.
41.
42.
43.

Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 267, 456 A.2d at 446.
Id. at 270, 456 A.2d at 447.
Id. at 276, 456 A.2d at 450.
"Least-cost" housing is the "least expensive housing that builders can provide

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss2/1
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in the lower income brackets, it will provide shelter for families
who could not otherwise afford housing in the suburban market:
"[a]t the very minimum, provision of least cost housing will
make certain that municipalities in 'growth' areas . . . do not

'grow' only for the well-to-do."' 4 While the form of least cost
housing may vary, any municipality utilizing such a measure is
required to zone significant areas for housing that most closely
approaches lower income housing, that is, in the opinion of the
court, mobile homes.
D. Judicial Remedies
If a trial court determines that a community has failed to
comply with its Mount Laurel obligation, it must order the municipality to revise its zoning law. If the municipality does not
comply, the court is empowered to utilize remedies which are
radical compared to the customary zoning remedies. In all cases
where the successful plaintiff is a developer, a builder's remedy
is authorized. The builder's remedy has been defined as "a form
of redress by which a builder-plaintiff in exclusionary zoning litigation is compensated for damages suffered as a result of the
invalid zoning ordinance by a judicial order permitting him to
proceed with his proposed development, subject to prescribed
conditions.

4

When a prevailing plaintiff-developer proposes to construct
a project containing a substantial amount of lower income housing, a "builder's remedy" will ordinarily be granted unless the
municipality establishes that, as a result of environmental or
other substantial planning concerns, the proposed project is contrary to sound land use planning. 4" The public interest is
thereby served by encouraging litigation to challenge zoning ordinances not in compliance with the court's mandate. Recognizing that public interest organizations lack the resources to bring
a sufficient number of cases to provide effective enforcement of
after removal by a municipality of all excessive restrictions and exactions and after thorough use by a municipality of all affirmative devices that might lower costs." Id. at 277,
456 A.2d at 451. See also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
44. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 277, 456 A.2d at 451.
45. Rose, supra note 21, at 870.
46. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 279-80, 456 A.2d at 452.
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Mount Laurel obligations, the court sought to increase the incentives for developers to pursue Mount Laurel litigation by encouraging the award of builder's remedies.
When invalidating a noncomplying ordinance, the trial
court is directed to order the offending municipality to incorporate affirmative measures into its new law. The decision specifically requires that the revisions be completed within ninety days
from judgment. To facilitate the revision, the court may appoint
a special master who is required to make his recommendations
and report to the trial court.4 7
If a municipality fails to produce a timely and constitutionally acceptable ordinance, then the court may order far-reaching
relief, including:
1. requiring that the municipality adopt particular amendments to enable it to comply with its Mount Laurel obligations;
2. delaying certain types of projects or construction until
its ordinance is satisfactorily revised or until its fair share of
housing is constructed or firm commitments obtained;
3. voiding the municipality's land-use regulations in whole
or in part to relax or eliminate building and use restrictions in
all or portions of the municipality; and
4. requiring that particular applications to construct housing that includes lower income units be approved by the appropriate municipal agencies.4 8
These remedies, which amount to an intrusion of an unprecedented degree into municipal zoning authority, will be invoked
after a municipality's zoning regulations have been found to be
constitutionally void and after the municipality has failed to satisfactorily revise its zoning ordinance.
In order to eliminate the potential for years of delay in complying with a municipality's Mount Laurel obligation resulting
by virtue of appeal, followed by enactment of a second potentially invalid ordinance and another round of time consuming
litigation, all questions are to be resolved in one proceeding with
but one appeal. Following a court's invalidation of its ordinance,
a municipality may revise its ordinance "under protest" and appeal the propriety of the original order that declared the ordi-

47. Id. at 281-84, 456 A.2d at 453-55.
48. Id. at 285-86, 456 A.2d at 455.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss2/1
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nance to be invalid. A judgment of compliance shall have res
judicata effect for a period of six years despite any change in
circumstances. This procedure, in the opinion of the court, assures that "the Mount Laurel obligation is to provide a realistic
opportunity for housing, not litigation."" 9
Although the Mount Laurel decisions cut deeply into one of
the most imperative preserves of municipal home rule, their requirements do not completely deprive a municipality in a
growth area of the power to control the character of its community. Once a municipality has complied with its Mount Laurel
obligation, it is required to do no more. Having complied, a municipality's land-use regulations may continue to contain restrictive provisions incompatible with the provision of lower income
housing, such as bedroom restrictions, large lot zoning, and
prohibitions against mobile homes. Such provisions will not be
held invalid because of the requirements of Mount Laurel. "Municipalities may continue to reserve areas for upper income
housing, may continue to require certain community amenities
in certain areas, may continue to zone with some regard to their
fiscal obligations: they may do all of this, provided that they
have otherwise complied with their Mount Laurel obligations." 50
Moreover, in order to prevent a drastic change in the character
of the community, the court specifically recognized that a municipality may, in appropriate circumstances, be permitted to
"phase-in" its fair share of the housing need over a number of
years.'
Although the court went to great lengths to mollify citizens
and government officials, the conclusion is inescapable that the
prerogatives of local government in New Jersey has been drastically curtailed. For example, by requiring municipalities to eliminate "excessive" zoning and subdivision restrictions and exactions, the court effectively deprived municipal legislative bodies
of the authority to control the character of the community or to
require developers to bear the cost of public improvements.
"Anti-look-alike" 5 ordinances and similar regulations which at-

49. Id. at 352, 456 A.2d at 490.
50. Id. at 260, 456 A.2d at 442.
51. Id. at 215, 456 A.2d at 420.
52. "Anti-look alike" zoning provisions "seek to prevent ugly and monotonous rows
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tempt to preserve a particular aesthetic quality in a community
are presumed to be cost-generating devices that, in the view of
the New Jersey courts, are not necessary to protect the public
health and safety and must, therefore, fail. Similarly, it may be
assumed that a New Jersey court may consider the rationale for
a number of other restrictions to be insufficiently related to the
public health and welfare and to be too costly in terms of development costs to survive its scrutiny. These include minimum lot
size, other area and bulk requirements, preparation of environmental impact statements, specifications for road construction,
hook-up fees, time consuming application procedures or, perhaps, installation of public improvements. The absence of such
regulations certainly makes housing more affordable to the purchaser, but those costs, both economic and societal, must be
borne by the taxpayers and residents of the community. Similarly, the requirement that land be "overzoned" in certain circumstances in order to create an oversupply of less costly residential land is the antithesis of sound planning. Comprehensive
and rational planning are assigned a subservient position.
The presumptive grant of a builder's remedy to a successful
developer-plaintiff who will construct low income housing involves the judiciary in the legislative affairs of a municipality to
an unprecedented extent. Moreover, the remedy which, in effect,
grants a building permit to the developer, deprives municipal
boards from injecting sound planning into the project, and prevents such boards from mitigating undesirable effects of the
development.
Although Mount Laurel II firmly established the broad parameters to be applied to allegedly exclusionary zoning laws, a
myriad of issues remained unresolved. The panel of three Mount
Laurel trial judges was left to formulate the methodology required to implement the principles announced by the court.
Their decisions illustrate the practical difficulties encountered in
the enforcement of such a revolutionary "right" and in the

of identical houses which are thought to encourage urban decay as well as to mar the
beauty of the whole community. A representative section authorizes denial of a building
permit where the planned structure is excessively similar to an existing or permitted

structure within 250 feet of the proposed site." 1 ANDERSON,
PRACTICE

NEW YORK ZONING LAW AND

§ 8.41 (3d ed. 1984).
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14

1986]

EXCLUSIONARY ZONING

courts' attempts to bring rationality and predictability to such a
controversial and emotional arena. These decisions, until recently unreported, supplement and clarify Mount Laurel II and
are particularly relevant to any attempt to assess the impact of
Mount Laurel II on future zoning challenges in New York State.
It is the application of the principles announced in Mount Laurel II which most clearly reflects the strengths and weakness of
this revolutionary decision.
E. Fair Share Determination
1. Fair Share Methodology
The first Mount Laurel H case to be fully tried in New
Jersey since the Mount Laurel II decision was AMG Realty Co.
v. Township of Warren.53 This case permitted the court to address the most important of the many issues left unresolved by
the Mount Laurel II decision, namely, the method of determination of fair share allocation. Mount Laurel H established that
for exclusionary zoning to be eliminated, voluntary compliance
with the constitutional mandate must be encouraged, litigation
to vindicate that obligation must be simplified and judicial remedies made more effective.H The promulgation of a fair share
methodology by Judge Serpentelli, one of the three designated
Mount Laurel judges," was designed to promote voluntary compliance so that each affected municipality could calculate its fair
share obligation and adopt zoning laws to satisfy that
obligation."'
Similarly, Judge Serpentelli foresaw that setting forth such
a methodology would simplify litigation and create a more effective judicial remedy because the most time consuming and expensive aspect of Mount Laurel II litigation - the determination of fair share would be virtually eliminated from
controversy. The court recognized that the adopted methodology
merely represented the beginning of a refinement process that

53. No. L-23277-80 PW (N.J. Super. Ct. July 16, 1984).
54. Mount Laurel H, 92 N.J. at 218, 291, 456 A.2d at 420, 458.
55. The three judges designated to hear Mount Laurel disputes are Judges
Serpentelli, Skillman and Gibson.
56. AMG Realty Co. v. Township of Warren, No. L-23277-80 PW, slip op. at 10-11
(N.J. Super. Ct. July 16, 1984).
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should serve as the impetus for planners and attorneys to improve upon or replace.57 Realizing that the planning community
could have debated over equally reasonable alternatives for
years, Judge Serpentelli stated that prompt judicial resolution of
the Mount Laurel H issues was required 58to implement the constitutional mandate of Mount Laurel H.
2.

Region

In order to derive a municipality's fair share allocation, it is
first necessary to circumscribe the "region" of which the municipality is a part. The Mount Laurel II decision provided only
general guidance in defining a region as "that general area which
constitutes, more or less, the housing market area of which the
subject municipality is a part, and from which the prospective
population of the municipality would substantially be drawn, in
the absence of exclusionary zoning. '59 In declining to provide
further guidance, the supreme court recognized that the determination of such issue was better left to the experts who would
participate in future Mount Laurel II litigation."
The experts testifying in the AMG trial advanced two conceptual approaches to delineate region, the fixed line and commutershed approaches. "[A] commutershed approach defines a
region by starting with the functional center of the municipality
and identifying all points that could be reached during a reasonable commuting time by travelling outward in all directions on
existing roadways." 61 Such an approach would necessitate separate analysis for each municipality. On the other hand, a "fixed
line approach defines a region through rigid lines derived by analyzing the standards for an appropriate region as articulated in
Mount Laurel II.""
In order to define region for the appropriate inquiry, Judge
Serpentelli adopted a dual region concept, "widely embraced by
members of the planning community as being much more reflec57. Id. at 78.
58. Id. at 78-79.
59. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 256, 456 A.2d at 440 (quoting Oakwood at Madison,
Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 543, 371 A.2d 1192, 1219 (1977)).
60. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 256, 456 A.2d at 440.
61. AMG Realty, No. L-23277-80 PW, slip op. at 12 (N.J. Super. Ct. July 16, 1984).
62. Id. at 11-12.
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tive of the goals expressed in Mount Laurel H than any single
region concept," 63 consisting of a present need region and a prospective need region. Recognizing that there is practical difficulty in formulating one region which would achieve all the
objectives of Mount Laurel H, the court observed:
[A] region which focuses on enabling people to live in proximity
to their work may satisfy prospective housing demands, but it
may be too small to provide the resources necessary to absorb the
excess present need generated by the urban areas. Conversely, a
region which focuses on providing the resources necessary to absorb the excess present need of the urban areas may be too large
to accurately address the prospective housing demand. 4
The present need region, defined by the boundary of the county
in which the municipality is located, is "intended to balance the
high levels of need in the older urban core municipalities of that
region and the resources to meet that need in the less dense and
newer suburban areas of the region." 5
The prospective need region was determined to be a modified commutershed area which would be large enough to accommodate special commuting patterns or employment concentrations.6 6 Such prospective regional need was to be the
"commutershed measured in all directions from the functional
6' 7
center of a municipality based on a thirty minute drive time.
The functional center is to be the generally recognized commercial-residential core of a community, that is, the "downtown
area. ' 8 In the absence of a commercial-residential core in a
community, the functional center is to be considered to be the
community's municipal building.6 9 Absent either of the above,
the functional center is viewed to be the major crossroads within
the municipality.7 0 The entire area of any county is considered
63. Id. at 31.
64. Id. at 30.
65. Id. at 12.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 13. "The thirty minute drive is measured by the following speeds:
1. 30 miles per hour on local and county roads, 2. 40 miles per hour on state and federal
highways, 3. 50 miles per hour on interstate highways, the Garden State Parkway and
the New Jersey Turnpike." Id. at 14.
68. Id. at 13.
69. Id. at 13-14.
70. Id.
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to be within a municipality's commutershed if a thirty minute
drive would enter the county at any point.Y
3.

Present Regional Need

A municipality's present need consists of two components:
the indigenous need within the municipality, and its fair share
of the reallocated excess need of the municipality's present need
region. The AMG court defined "indigenous need" as "substandard housing currently existing in any municipality." 72 Mount
Laurel II required all municipalities, regardless of their designation in the SDGP, to provide for their indigenous needs. 73 Since
some municipalities have an indigenous need which exceeds
their fair share, "[tihey should not be expected to provide decent housing for a disproportionate share of the need. 7 4 Accordingly, when the percentage of the total regional housing stock
which is substandard is calculated, any municipality whose indigenous need in relation to its housing stock is in excess of that
regional need will have its excess assigned to a reallocation
pool. 75 Such excess need will be allocated to municipalities
which contain an area designated as a growth area in the SDGP.
One of the most persistently contested issues in Mount
Laurel H litigation has been the identification of substandard
units. According to the AMG decision, a housing unit is considered substandard if it possesses any of the following
characteristics:
1. Overcrowded units - defined as dwelling units occupied by
more than 1.01 persons per room.
2. Units lacking complete plumbing facilities for the exclusive
use of the occupants.
7
3. Units lacking adequate heating. 1
An unduplicated count of such units can be ascertained from the

71. Id. at 14.
72. Id.
73. Mount Laurel H, 92 N.J. at 214-15, 456 A.2d at 418.
74. AMG Realty, No. L-23277-80 PW, slip op. at 14 (N.J. Super. Ct. July 16, 1984).
75. Id. at 14-15. Excess need is reallocated whether the municipality is designated
by the SDGP as being in a growth area or not. Id. at 14; Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 24344, 456 A.2d at 433.
76. AMG Realty, No. L-23277-80 PW, slip op. at 15 (N.J. Super. Ct. July 16, 1984).
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1980 census. To obtain the number of substandard units occupied by lower income households, that is, the indigenous need,
the AMG court held that the number of substandard units must
be multiplied by .82, a factor to reflect that eighteen percent of
the substandard housing in New Jersey was considered not to be
77
occupied by low and moderate income families.
The court required a number of comparisons in order to determine whether a municipality may transfer a portion of its indigenous need to the excess pool and, if so, the extent to which
it may. Initially, the number of substandard units in the present
need region must be expressed as a percentage of the total housing stock of the region (denominated as "regional substandard
housing percentage"). Next, the number of substandard units
for each municipality in the present need region must be calculated as a percentage of each municipality's housing stock (denominated as "municipal substandard housing percentage"). To
the extent that the percentage of substandard units in any municipality exceeds the regional percentage, those units are reallocated to the excess pool of present need and will be reallocated
to municipalities in growth areas through the utilization of present need allocation factors. 8
4.

Prospective Regional Need

While the methodology of the AMG court considers any
need generated prior to 1980 which still exists to constitute present need, prospective need refers to the households expected to
be formed between 1980 and 1990:79

[T]he prospective need is calculated by projecting population increases by age cohort through the averaging of two projection
models, applying a headstart rate to obtain the number of households expected to be formed and by multiplying that number by
the percentage of the population which is classified as lower
income.80

77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id. at 43. See also id. at 17.
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Present Need Allocation

The court relied upon three factors in order to determine
the manner in which the surplus present need of municipalities
is to be redistributed from the excess pool: growth area, present
employment, and medium income. The growth area factor is the
percentage determined by dividing the number of growth area
acres within a municipality by the number of growth area acres
within the present need region. 8 ' The purpose of the growth factor is to consider the physical capacity of a municipality to provide land for new construction by identifying the areas within a
municipality which have been designated by the SDGP as appropriate for development.8 2 Although the court recognized that
a municipality's ability to accommodate development would be
more appropriately measured by examination of the amount of
vacant developable land within the growth area, the lack of reliable data prohibits the use of this method.8 3
The present employment component is determined by dividing the total number of 1982 private sector jobs covered by
unemployment compensation within a municipality by the total
number of covered jobs within the present need region. 4 This
component recognizes the concern of the Mount Laurel II court
that individuals be able to reside in decent housing in the vicinity of their place of employment. 5 It represents the present
housing demand to the extent that the existence of jobs creates
the need for housing. Judge Serpentelli also noted that this factor "may also reflect a policy of exclusion which has existed for
many years because some towns have invited factories but excluded the workers."8 6
The medium income aspect of the formula is the ratio of
medium income of a municipality to the medium income of the
present need region.8 7 Mount Laurel H recognized that compli-

81. Id. at 18.
82. Id. at 49.
83. Id. at 50.
84. Id. at 18.
85. Id. at 51; Mount Laurel H, 92 N.J. at 210-11 n.5, 456 A.2d at 415 n.5.
86. AMG Realty, No. L-23277-80 PW, slip op. at 51 (N.J. Super. Ct. July 16, 1984).
87. Id. at 18. In rejecting objections to the use of an economic factor, Judge
Serpentelli determined that, "[wlhile I have some reservations as to whether further experience will demonstrate that this factor will accomplish its objectives, those concerns
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ance with its mandates might impose substantial financial burdens on municipalities. 8 The impact of medium income is
designed to consider a community's ability to afford the expense
of the construction of the public improvements and infrastructure required for high density construction, and to seek to equitably distribute such burdens.8 9 Similarly, the factor seeks to
identify prior exclusionary practices, and to reward past inclusionary efforts recognizing both that a municipality must plan
for all income levels, and that "fairness requires that prior inclusionary construction ... should be rewarded." 90
The data used in such calculations must exclude non-growth
municipalities from the regional computation. The resulting percentage when multiplied by the regional reallocation pool results
in a municipality's fair share of that need."1
6.

Prospective Need Allocation

The allocation formula employed to allocate prospective regional need utilizes the same three factors as in the present need
allocation formula, 92 but includes a fourth determinate, employment growth. Employment growth is the percentage calculated
by dividing the covered employment growth from 1972 to 1982
within a municipality by the covered employment growth within
the prospective need region for the same period."' The employ9
ment growth factor is utilized to predict future job growth. 4
The court found that this element accurately measures employment trends, and reflects the land-use policies of a municipal-

are overridden by the importance of having an economic indicator which mirrors fiscal
capacity, prior exclusion, and most importantly, past inclusion." Id. at 54.
88. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 265, 456 A.2d at 445.
89. AMG Realty, No. L-23277-80 PW, slip op. at 52 (N.J. Super. Ct. July 16, 1984).
90. Id.
91. Because the other factors are expressed as percentages, the medium income ratio
must be converted to a percentage. In order to accomplish such a conversion, the first
two factors must be averaged to create one percentage which is multiplied by the medium income ratio. The result is averaged along with the first two percentages by dividing the sum of factors one, two and the converted third factor, by three to create a single
percentage. The resulting number is multiplied by the total reallocation pool for the
region to determine the municipality's fair share of that pool. Id. at 18-19.
92. See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
93. AMG Realty, No. L-23277-80 PW, slip op. at 19 (N.J. Super. Ct. July 16, 1984).
94. Id. at 60.
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ity.9 The court considered that the use of the two employment
factors in the prospective need formula would mitigate against
unfair conclusions which might result from the utilization of
only employment growth.96
7.

Fair Share Calculation

A municipality's fair share allocation can, accordingly, be
calculated by utilizing the allocation formulas, and combining
the indigenous, the surplus present and the prospective need
figures. In addition, however, the court requires that an adjustment be made to the surplus present and prospective need
figures to compensate for inadequate vacant developable land,
and for vacancy rates. 9 7 These need determinations are required
to be increased by twenty percent to compensate for the loss of
housing units resulting from the reduction of fair share allocations due to the absence of adequate developable land in various
municipalities. 8 In addition, an unoccupied reserve was mandated by the court to permit mobility.9 9 In the event that fair
share allocations exactly matched need, one could not move unless someone else vacated their residence to make room for
them. Thus, the court provided for sufficient vacancies to facilitate mobility in housing choice by increasing the need factor by
three percent.10 0
The Mount Laurel II decision authorized the trial judge to
allow the fair share obligation to be phased-in over a number of
years.10 ' Judge Serpentelli, however, was of the opinion that the
95. Id.
96. Id. A municipality which historically had little employment, but experienced a
recent, sudden burst of employment might, according to an example posed by the court,
be assessed an unrealistically high fair share allocation in the absence of an employment
growth factor.
The computation of a municipality's prospective fair share obligation is computed in
a manner similar to its present need allocation. The medium income factor must be expressed as a percentage by averaging the first three factors to obtain one percentage
which is multiplied by the medium income ratio. The resulting percentage must be averaged with the other three factors by dividing the same by four. The resulting percentage
is multiplied by the prospective regional need to obtain the prospective need. Id. at 20.
97. Id. at 23.
98. Id. at 46.
99. Id. at 48.
100. Id.
101. Mount Laurel H, 92 N.J. at 219, 456 A.2d at 420.
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circumstances of each case should dictate whether the court
should exercise its discretion to permit such deferral of a municipality's obligation - the phasing-in of present need should not
be automatic.102
Recognizing that the formulas utilized can be challenged for
a variety of reasons, the court held that "[the pivotal question
is not whether the numbers are too high or low, but whether the
methodology that produces the numbers is reasonable." 103 Moreover, the methodology must also be "sufficiently structured to
produce consistent results and it must be sufficiently flexible to
deal with extreme cases at both ends of the spectrum."' 0 ' The
102. AMG Realty, No. L-23277-80 PW, slip op. at 43 (N.J. Super. Ct. July 16, 1984).
103. Id. at 74.
104. Id. at 76. The following will illustrate the determination of the "fair share"
methodology utilized in AMG Realty:
Application of Fair Share Methodology to Warren Township
1. Region
The present need region for Warren (Region I) consists of eleven counties ....
The prospective need region for Warren consists of ... six counties ....
2. Regional Need
The indigenous need for Warren is 52. The eleven county reallocated present need
pool is 35,014 and the six county prospective need is 49,004.
3. Allocation Factors
-Present Need
Using the eleven county present need region, Warren's fair share of the reallocation pool of 35,014 is 162 for the decade of 1980-1990 based upon the following
calculation.
Warren's present need percentage of the present regional need is 1.126%
which is arrived at as follows:
Growth Area = 1.780%
Present Employment = .179%
Median Income ratio = 1.45
(1.780 + .179)/2 = .9795 x 1.45 = 1.420%
([this] represents the percentage modified by the ratio)
(1.780 + .179 + 1.420)/3 = 1.126%
Reallocation Excess Pool = 35,014 x 1.126 (fair share %)
Municipal Share = 394
Phased in by one third (394/3) = 131
Additional 20% reallocation (131 x 1.2) = 157
Vacancy allowance (157 x 1.03) - 162
Total Present Need is:
(Indigenous) 52 + (Reallocated Present) 162 = (Total) 214
-Prospective Need
Warren's fair share of the prospective regional need of 49,004 is 732 units for
the decade of 1980-1990.
Warren's prospective need percentage of the prospective regional need is
1.208", computed as follows:
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court believed that its methodolgy was flexible and not "blindly
rigid" because it permitted the vacant developable land defense
and rewarded communities which had made inclusionary efforts
through the utilization of the medium income factor and direct
credits." 5
Utilizing the methodology adopted by it, the court determined that Warren Township's total fair share obligation was
946 units.1 06 Warren Township would be required to remove all
excessive restrictions and exactions precluding construction of
its fair share if its ordinances were to be found in compliance
with Mount Laurel 11.107 The affirmative measures set forth in
Mount Laurel II would be required if such action failed to generate realistic housing opportunites.1 0 8 It was undisputed among
the parties that the Warren Township zoning ordinances could
not produce the quantity of units required to satisfy its fair
share obligation. 109 Had the ordinance provided for sufficient
density, however, it might have been necessary to remove other
provisions which might be held to be an excessive restriction or
exaction. Among the provisions of the Warren Code which might
be considered to be excessive restrictions or exactions are: 1) a
requirement that all townhouses contain private garages; 2) a reGrowth Area = 2.556%
Present Employment = .304%
Employment Growth = .428%
Median Income Ratio = 1.41
(2.556 + .304 + .428)3 = 1.096% x 1.41 = 1.545
([this] represents the percentage modified by the ratio)
(2.556 + .304 + .428 + 1.545)/4 = 1.208%
Prospective Regional Need = 49,004 x 1.208 = (fair share %)
Municipal Share = 592

Additional 20%
Reallocation (592 x 1.2) = 710
Vacancy Allowance (710 x 1.03) = 732
SUMMARY
(Total Present Need) 214 + (Total Prospective need) 732 = (Total Fair Share)
946
Id. at 25-28.
105. Id. at 77.
106. The total fair share determination consisted of an indigenous need of 52, id. at
26, present regional need of 162, id., and prospective need of 732. Id. at 27.
107. Id. at 63; Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 258-59, 456 A.2d at 441.
108. AMG Realty, No. L-23277-80 PW, slip op. at 63 (N.J. Super. Ct. July 16, 1984);
Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 260-74, 456 A.2d at 442-50.
109. AMG Realty, No. L-23277-80 PW, slip op. at 64 (N.J. Super. Ct. July 16, 1984).
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quirement that every townhouse have a significantly different
design from every other townhouse within 150 feet; 3) excessive
setbacks provision which could be cost generating or affect density by severely constraining the site layout; 4) front yard
screening; 5) broad discretion to deny site plan if the use is
deemed not to be in the public interest; and 6) inadequate flexibility concerning road widths and other multiple dwelling
requirements.1 10
Although failing to rule on plaintiffs' allegations that the
thirty percent mandatory set-aside for lower income housing
provided by the defendant was not feasible, the court concluded
that:
For a mandatory set aside to be effective, the set aside must
be reasonable and the unit density must be reasonable. If the set
aside is reasonable and the density is reasonable, actual construction will result. If the set aside is too high or the density is too
low, no construction will occur because the project must be
profitable.1 '
F.

Rutgers Report Fair Share Allocation

Subsequent to the AMG decision, Judge Skillman adopted a
different method of identifying the present need obligation of a
municipality other than the Urban League analysis utilized in
AMG. 112 In Countryside Properties, Inc. v. Mayor of Ring-

wood,11 a the court adopted the

RUTGERS REPORT114

as "the most

sophisticated and reliable methodology for determining the ex110. Id. at 65-67. In Flama Construction Corp. v. Township of Franklin, 201 N.J.
Super. 498, 493 A.2d 587 (1985), the court upheld an ordinance which required an applicant to pay into an escrow fund sums to be expended for professional review of the
application as a prerequisite to any action by the planning board or board of adjustment.
The ordinance specified the amount to be posted based upon the size and type of development. In rejecting assertions that the ordinance exerted an exclusionary effect on development, the court concluded that "the ordinance neither creates a burdensome financial threshold nor lengthens the approval process ...." Id. at 506, 493 A.2d at 591-92.
111. AMG Realty, No. L-23277-80 PW, slip op. at 67 (N.J. Super. Ct. July 16, 1984).
112. Id. at 7-9.
113. Countryside Properties, Inc. v. Mayor of Ringwood, 205 N.J. Super. 291, 500
A.2d 767 (1984).

114. CENTER FOR URBAN POLICY RESEARCH,RUTGERS-THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW
JERSEY, MOUNT LAUREL II; CHALLENGE & DELIVERY OF Low-COST HOUSING (1983) [hereinafter cited as RUTGERS REPORT].
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tent of lower income persons occupying deficient housing.''

The

RUTGERS REPORT

5

utilizes seven negative characteristics or

"surrogates" of housing surveyed in the 1980 census to identify
whether a housing unit should be considered as substandard:
whether the unit built prior to 1940, is occupied by more than
1.01 persons per room, permits access only by entering through
another dwelling, lacks plumbing facilities for the exclusive use of
occupants, lacks complete kitchen facilities, or lacks an elevator if
located in a more than four story structure." 6
Any dwelling unit constructed after 1940 is considered to be
7
substandard if two of the other six characteristics are present."
Any unit constructed before 1940, however, is considered to be
substandard if one of the surrogates exists." 8 The court concluded that the seven surrogate methodology employed by the
RUTGERS REPORT is more reliable than the three surrogate Urban League approach." 9

The source of the

RUTGERS REPORT

information on deficient

housing is a five percent sample of New Jersey households conducted by the United States Census Bureau, the New Jersey
Public Use sample. Utilizing the computer correlation of the surrogates, the number of deficient homes may be ascertained, as
well as the household size and the income levels of the families
occupying the units in order to establish what proportion of the
units are occupied by lower income families. 120 The Public Use
sample is not, however, generally available on the municipal
level.

In determining that the

RUTGERS REPORT

methodology is a

more reliable method of calculation of regional need, the court
observed that the "most serious weakness in the Urban League
methodology is its assumption that eighty-two percent of the
housing units designated as deficient are occupied by lower in-

115. Countryside Properties,205 N.J. Super. at 300, 500 A.2d at 772.
116. Id. at 296, 500 A.2d at 770.
117. Id. at 300, 500 A.2d at 772; see also J.W. Field Co. v. Township of Franklin, 206
N.J. Super. 165, 170, 501 A.2d 1075, 1078 (1985).
118. Countryside Properties,205 N.J. Super. at 305, 500 A.2d at 774; see also J.W.
Field Co., 206 N.J. Super. at 170, 501 A.2d at 1078.
119. Countryside Properties, 205 N.J. Super. at 304, 500 A.2d at 774.
120. Id. at 299, 500 A.2d at 771.
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come persons. "121 The court found that the Tri-State Regional
Planning Commission determination of eighty-two percent was
inaccurate with respect to New Jersey households occupying deficient housing who are lower income persons in that: the study
included the entire New York metropolitan area, with New York
statistics consequently dominating the statistics, the primary
source of information was the 1970 census, and the term "inadequate housing" included units occupied by persons who pay a
disproportionate percentage of income for housing or commute
an excessive distance to work, characteristics not included in the
Urban League methodology as constituting part of present
need. 22

Judge Skillman determined that although the

RUTGERS RE-

is more reliable for determining the total number of substandard dwelling units occupied by lower income persons, the
Urban League methodology is appropriate to convert the subregion need to a municipal level. Accordingly, he adopted a methodology which utilizes the Urban League methodology to determine the percentage of subregion present need in a particular
municipality. That figure is compared to the total present need
PORT

of the subregion arrived at by using the

RUTGERS REPORT

meth-

odology. By dividing the deficient municipal housing by the subregion deficiency, the percentage need of the subregional need
would be established. The municipality's fair share obligation
would be calculated by multiplying that resulting percentage by
12
the number of total subregional deficient units. 1
In J.W. Field Co. v. Township of Franklin,24 Judge
Serpentelli continued "the process of development of a method
of fair share allocation,"'12 5 and modified somewhat the methodology previously adopted in AMG. This modification was made
in light of subsequent proof of the reliability of the methods

used in the

RUTGERS REPORT

and the criticism of the Tri-State

Planning Commission report of determination of the percentage
of substandard housing units occupied by lower income persons

121.
122.
123.
501 A.2d
124.
125.

Id. at 300, 500 A.2d at 772.
Id. at 301, 500 A.2d at 772.
Id. at 304, 500 A.2d at 774; see also J.W. Fields Co., 206 N.J. Super. at 172-73,
at 1079.
206 N.J. Super. 165, 501 A.2d 1075 (1985).
Id. at 167, 501 A.2d at 1076.
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in Countryside Properties.
Judge Serpentelli concluded that the eighty-two percent
Tri-State estimate should be replaced by the determination of
lower income percentage of occupancy of deficient units advanced by the RUTGERS REPORT.1 1 6 If the three surrogates utilized in AMG are income qualified through the use of the
RUTGERS REPORT

computer tapes, the court's determination is

that 64.2% of the deficient units in the appropriate eleven
county region were occupied by lower income families. 2 ' The
decrease in this factor resulted in a smaller number of deficient
units in the region. 2 8 Because the pool of present need to be
reallocated is determined by the relationship of the regional percentage of deficient housing to regional housing stock, the court
required that the excess pool must be recalculated.' 9 The court
further determined that:
[T]he same reasons which justify the use of the percentage of deficient units generated by the computer tapes on a regional basis
to produce the municipality's reallocated excess obligation, also
justify the use of the percentage on a subregional basis in order to
determine the indigenous responsibility of the municipality. 30
The court found, however, that the balance of the AMG
methodology is the correct approach to identifying and allocating the indigenous and excess present housing needs.' 3' In re-

jecting the remainder of the

RUTGERS REPORT

approach, Judge

Serpentelli cast doubt upon the validity of a number of the surrogates utilized, particularly the use of the absence of an elevator to determine deficiency of housing, the lack of central heating, and the use of the year 1940 as a consideration of
dilapidation.132 He also found the RUTGERS REPORT approach to
be weak in its inability to generate housing numbers for individual municipalities by the use of the seven surrogates, in its inability to disaggregate the subregion numbers, and in the fact

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 172, 501 A.2d at 1079.
at 174, 501 A.2d at 1080.

at 173, 175, 501 A.2d at 1079, 1080.
at 175, 501 A.2d at 1080.
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that significant delays in receipt of current information existed. 133 On the other hand, the court considered the AMG
methodology to be superior in that it: utilizes "three simple, direct indicia of substandardness;" the three factors are "individually identifiable in an unduplicated manner in census data" and
"can be independently identified for each municipality;" and the
three are "clearly reflective of substandardness. 134 Additionally,
the court noted that "[t]he use of the heating deficiency factor
in AMG is more in keeping with a reasonable definition of adequate heating inasmuch as many building codes permit heating
through the use of a flue even if central heating units are not
utilized."'n
G.

Builder's Remedies and Municipal Compliance

Although the aim of the court in utilizing the SDGP was to
channel development into "growth" areas, in Orgo Farms &
Greenhouses, Inc. v. Township of Colts Neck, 3 ' the court determined that the location of a developer's property in an area designated as "limited growth" by the SDGP does not preclude the
granting of a builder's remedy as a matter of law with respect to
the property. The Township had asserted that the granting of a
builder's remedy in a limited growth area would violate the pattern of orderly development envisioned by the New Jersey Supreme Court in basing Mount Laurel planning on the SDGP.
Judge Serpentelli, however, found nothing in the SDGP or
Mount Laurel H to sustain the Township's position because the
"concept maps of the SDGP, by admission of the authors, 'consist of broad, generalized areas without site specific detail or precise boundaries .... , ,,137
Among the various rationales advanced by the court in support of its holding is one of strict practicality, that is, the negative impact on the goals of the Mount Laurel decision that
would result from a contrary decision.1 3 8 The court noted that
133.
134.
135.
136.
599, 471
137.
138.

Id. at 175-76, 501 A.2d at 1081.
Id. at 176, 501 A.2d at 1081.
Id.
Orgo Farms & Greenhouses, Inc. v. Township of Colts Neck, 192 N.J. Super.
A.2d 812 (1983).
Id. at 604, 471 A.2d at 814 (quoting SDGP at ii-iii).
Id. at 606-07, 471 A.2d at 814. The court offered four reasons for its conclusion:
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since less than fifty percent of the land in New Jersey is classified as growth, it was imperative to preserve all appropriate sites
for potential development. 139 Moreover, the court found that because the purpose of the SDGP was to control growth, not eliminate it, it was not contemplated that limited growth areas would
never accommodate growth under any circumstances.4 0
Judge Serpentelli also found that a contrary decision would
be destructive of the mandate that all communities, even those
located entirely within limited growth areas, make provisions for
their indigenous poor.1 41 Were denial of a builder's remedy to be
based solely on the SDGP classification, as opposed to the environmental and planning considerations of the third prong of the
entitlement analysis, all incentives to provide adequate housing
in such areas would be abandoned. 142 "The paradox created is
that those least economically able to move would be required to
do just that, because the only decent, affordable housing to be

built would be in a growth area. "143

An additional basis articulated by the court for its decision
is the absence of any reference to the SDGP classification in
Mount Laurel H's discussion of entitlement. First, the Mount
Laurel H court's carefully worded discussion of the elements required as a prerequisite to the award of a builder's remedy did
not refer to the SDGP designations.14 4 Second, the Mount Laurel H court applied those elements to four of the six cases decided without using the SDGP. 45 Finally, the Mount Laurel H

1. The spirit of the opinion calls for this result.
2. The impact that a contrary result would have on the Mount Laurel goals is entirely inconsistent with those goals.
3. The court's discussion of the builder's remedy makes no reference to the SDGP
classification.
4. Caputo v. Chester, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983) (Mount Laurel H, 92 N.J. at
309, 456 A.2d at 468) suggests the possibility that a remedy is available in a limited
growth area. Orgo Farms & Greenhouses, 192 N.J. at 605, 471 A.2d at 814.
139. Orgo Farms & Greenhouses, 192 N.J. Super. at 606, 471 A.2d at 815.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 606-07, 471 A.2d at 815.
144. Id. at 607, 471 A.2d at 815.
145. Id. at 607, 471 A.2d at 815-16. The four cases referred to are: Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel; Caputo v. Township of Chester;
Glenview Dev. Co. v. Township of Franklin; and Round Valley, Inc. v. Township of Clin-
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court meticulously detailed the limits it would impose on the
granting of a builder's remedy. "[H]ad the court intended to restrict the remedy to growth areas, it would have done so at this
point."146
To assure that the decision would not result in bad land
use, Judge Serpentelli stated that when a trial court is faced
with a demand for a builder's remedy for property located in a
limited growth area, substantial weight should, nonetheless, be
accorded the SDGP classification as it relates to the environmental and planning concerns of the third prong of the entitlement test.14 7 Moreover, the court suggested that it may be appropriate in such situations to reverse the standard burden of
proof to require the builder to prove the absence of detrimental
environmental and planning effects in order to receive a
builder's remedy. 14 8 While declining to specifically make such a
ruling at that time, the court found that a developer seeking a
builder's remedy in a limited growth area should be required to
participate to a greater extent in assisting the court in its determination of the environmental and planning issues.'4 9
The effectiveness of the Mount Laurel doctrine depends
upon voluntary compliance by municipalities, and the invocation
of remedies to assure compliance by recalcitrant communities. It
was clearly the aspiration of Mount Laurel II to stimulate voluntary compliance with its principles, and to encourage settlement of Mount Laurel litigation. A municipality will, however,
be hesitant to rezone and take affirmative action unless the trial
court ratifies the settlement in a judgment of compliance binding third parties, thereby providing a six year period of repose
from Mount Laurel litigation. In the absence of such immunity,
settling communities would be subject to continuing interference
with the zoning process by virtue of subsequent developer claims
seeking builder's remedies. In Morris County Fair Housing
Council v. Boonton Township, 50 Judge Skillman established the

ton. These cases are among those consolidated at 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1981).
146. Orgo Farms & Greenhouses, 192 N.J. Super. at 607, 471 A.2d at 816.
147. Id. at 611, 471 A.2d at 818.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Morris County Fair Housing Council v. Boonton Township, 197 N.J. Super.
359, 484 A.2d 1302 (1984).
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procedure whereby such proposed settlements may be reviewed
by the court.
Although Mount Laurel II did not specifically state that a
judgment of compliance was intended to be binding on non-parties, the court did provide that upon the issuance of a judgment
of compliance, a community would be "free of litigious interference with the normal planning process." 5 ' Such insulation from
litigation is, the court concluded, possible only if a judgment of
compliance is binding on non-parties.15 2 The court classified
Mount Laurel litigation as being similar to other representative
actions which are binding on non-parties.1 53 Because a litigant in
a Mount Laurel action is granted standing as a representative of
lower income persons whose constitutional rights have been violated, and not in an individual capacity, a judgment should be
binding upon non-party lower income persons and on other
developers. 154
Although the entry of a judgment of compliance will enable
a municipality to engage in long term planning and to construct
the necessary infrastructure, the court must ensure that the settlement is in the best interests of those persons whose rights are
sought to be protected - lower income individuals. The court
observed that the risk of an inappropriate settlement is increased when the action is brought by a developer and not a
public interest group since the developer and the municipality
have a common interest which may not further the objectives of
Mount Laurel. The municipality may seek to have a low fair
share allocated to it, while a developer may be only interested in
the approval of his project. Accordingly, the court determined
that notice of a proposed settlement, its terms, and an opportunity to be heard in opposition thereto must be provided to the
public, public interest organizations, and property owners who
desire to construct lower income housing.1 55 If the court deter-

151. Id. at 364, 484 A.2d at 1305 (quoting Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 292, 456 A.2d
at 459).
152. Morris County FairHousing Council, 197 N.J. Super. at 364, 484 A.2d at 1305.
153. Id. at 364-65, 484 A.2d at 1305. The court considered Mount Laurel litigation
akin to class actions, suits by public officials or agencies which are authorized by law to
represent the public or a class of citizens, and taxpayers' actions.
154. Id. at 366, 484 A.2d at 1306.
155. Id. at 371, 484 A.2d at 1308.
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mines that a presentation in opposition to the settlement is inadequate to determine whether the settlement is fair and reasonable, it may appoint a master to make recommendations to
the court.' 56 "In fact, a master probably should be appointed as
a matter of course in any case where a developer is the only
' 57
party representing lower income persons." '
The court rejected the argument that the municipality's
precise "fair share number must be determined as a prerequisite
to the entry of a judgment of compliance because fair share determinations are the most time consuming and difficult part of
Mount Laurel II litigation. ' " 8 The court, therefore, held that to
require such a determination would be inconsistent with the
purposes of settlement of Mount Laurel litigation, that is, to
save litigation expense, to preserve judicial resources, and to facilitate the early construction of lower income housing rather
than interminable litigation.'"
Having determined that a municipality's ordinance violates
the mandates of Mount Laurel II, in what priority does the
court award builder's remedies among several plaintiffs whose
offers to build low and moderate income housing exceeds the
municipality's fair share requirement? In J. W. Field Co. v.
Township of Franklin'60 (FieldII) Judge Serpentelli enunciated
seven policy objectives which must be evaluated to devise a priority system of the award of a builder's remedy. The importance
of the first consideration - to encourage builders to institute
Mount Laurel litigation - is emphasized by the finding that
every Mount Laurel action since the Mount Laurel II decision
has been brought by a builder, rather than a non-profit group or
public agency.' 6 ' The granting of a builder's remedy is the economic inducement to stimulate developer enforcement of the
Mount Laurel obligation.1 62 It is granted as a matter of course if
the builder demonstrates noncompliance of a zoning law, pro-

156. Id. at 371, 484 A.2d at 1308-09.
157. Id. at 371 n.2, 484 A.2d at 1309 n.2.
158. Id. at 371, 484 A.2d at 1309.
159. Id. at 372, 484 A.2d at 1309.
160. J.W. Field Co. v. Township of Franklin, 204 N.J. Super. 445, 499 A.2d 251
(Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985).
161. Id. at 452, 499 A.2d at 254-55.
162. Id. at 452, 499 A.2d at 254.
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poses to construct a substantial amount of lower income housing, and the construction can be implemented without substantial negative environmental or planning impact.' 3 Second, a
"bright line" standard is necessary to avoid confusion, expense
and delay because, in the opinion of the court, a builder is less
likely to sue if he cannot assess the chances of being awarded a
builder's remedy with a reasonable certainty. 6 ' Third, the
award of a builder's remedy must maximize the opportunity for
lower income housing while minimizing the impact on the environment. 1 5 Accordingly, an award of a builder's remedy may be
softened by court authorization to phase-in development over a
number of years to avoid radical transformation of the
community. 16 6
Recognizing that the mandate of Mount Laurel is to provide housing, not litigation, the court, as a fourth consideration,
requires that any priority system will discourage litigation and
preserve municipal planning flexibility.6 7 Although multiple
plaintiffs are generally necessary to ensure prosecution of Mount
Laurel principles, "[e]xperience has also demonstrated ... that
there is a limit to the number of plaintiffs needed to vindicate
the constitutional obligation and that excessive plaintiffs can
emasculate the municipal planning options."16 8 Fairness and efficiency require the consolidation of all timely filed Mount Laurel
claims against a particular municipality.6 9 Such consolidation,
however, undermines the intent of Mount Laurel II by making
such litigation infinitely more complex and lengthy, and by potentially exposing the municipality to the award of multiple
builder's remedies, depriving it of planning flexibility and decreasing the likelihood of dispute settlement. 7 0 Fifth, although
the SDGP designation should not, as a matter of law, be a determinant of the right to a builder's remedy, it must be a factor in
determining the priority among the plaintiffs seeking the award

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 451-52, 499 A.2d at 254.
Id. at 453, 499 A.2d at 255.
Id. (citing Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 280, 331-32, 456 A.2d at 452-53, 479-80).
J. W. Field Co., 204 N.J. Super. at 453, 499 A.2d at 255.
Id. at 454, 499 A.2d at 255.
Id. at 454, 499 A.2d at 256.
Id.
Id. at 454-55, 499 A.2d at 256.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss2/1

34

EXCLUSIONARY ZONING

1986]

of a builder's remedy.17 1

One of the prime considerations of the Mount Laurel H decision was encouragement of voluntary compliance with the constitutional obligations enunciated therein.'72 Similarly, early settlement of Mount Laurel litigation benefits all parties. The
avoidance of builder suits and their early settlement enables the
municipality to preserve its planning flexibility in response to
Mount Laurel requirements. For example, where a municipality
concedes noncompliance and obtains the court's sanction of its
proposed fair share number, Judge Serpentelli has permitted
municipal litigants a ninety day period of immunity from the
filing of builder's remedy actions in order to facilitate the formulation of their planning response.17 3 Such a procedure is permitted once litigation has been commenced or in an action brought
74
by the municipality seeking declaratory relief.
The development of fair share methodologies has increased
the impetus for voluntary settlement of disputes because
"[m]ost of the reasonable methodologies, to date, have produced
fair share numbers within a relatively close range.'1 7

5

Moreover,

the court held that it will not insist on rigid adherence to its fair
share methodology when confronted with voluntary efforts at
compliance. 7 6 In order to provide an incentive for the prompt
settlement of Mount Laurel litigation, the Serpentelli court will
permit flexibility in settlement methods.

77

Accordingly, munici-

palities that voluntarily undertake to comply with Mount Laurel
may be entitled to a number of judicial concessions: flexibility in
determining fair share numbers, temporary immunity from
builder's remedy litigation, and the phasing-in of its fair share
requirement beyond 1990.178 The use of such devices, in the
opinion of the court, provides the greatest latitude to communities in planning their method of compliance with Mount Laurel,
and can remove or substantially ameliorate the overbuilding

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 455, 499 A.2d at 256.
Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 214, 456 A.2d at 418.
J. W. Field Co., 204 N.J. Super. at 456, 499 A.2d at 257.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 456-57, 499 A.2d at 257.

Id.
Id. at 458, 499 A.2d at 258.
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which results from the satisfaction of a municipality's responsi79
bility by utilization of twenty percent mandatory set-asides.1
Alternate methods of compliance are authorized if a municipality seeks to voluntarily comply, but such flexibility is lost if, as a
result of litigation, a community's fair share must be satisfied by
the use of builder's remedies. 180 A municipality can avoid being
placed in the uncomfortable position where the court must prioritize builder's remedies: "[ilts choice is to seize the initiative
through voluntary compliance, early settlement and compliance
mechanisms such as phasing or wait to be sued and possibly
subject itself to a court imposed priority arrangement.' 81
The seventh policy consideration, actual construction, favors the involvement of multiple plaintiffs in Mount Laurel litigation, resulting in greater assurance that Mount Laurel construction will take place. Absent such impetus, the mere
rezoning of property to comply with a municipality's Mount
Laurel obligation will not ensure actual construction. Because
the mere revision of a zoning ordinance does not ensure that actual Mount Laurel construction will occur, the seventh policy
consideration is the promotion of actual construction. Since intangibles such as the predilections of property owners, political
pressures not to sell property, and property price inflation as the
result of rezoning and other factors, may result in an uncertain
future for such rezoned land, the involvement of multiple plaintiffs in Mount Laurel litigation results in greater assurance that
82
Mount Laurel construction will take place.1
Utilizing the above policy considerations, Judge Serpentelli
devised a four-step system of priorities in the awarding of
builder's remedies when multiple builder-plaintiffs have participated in Mount Laurel litigation. Initially, a builder must meet
the threshold test of entitlement in order to participate in the
prioritization process. 83 Accordingly, a builder-plaintiff who
does not participate in that portion of a Mount Laurel trial in
which noncompliance is proved, is not entitled to a builder's

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
Co., 204

Id.
Id. at 459, 499 A.2d at 258.
Id.
Id. at 459-60, 499 A.2d at 258-59.
See Mount Laurel 1I, 92 N.J. at 279-80, 456 A.2d at 452, see also J. W. Field
N.J. Super. at 460, 499 A.2d at 259.
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remedy. 1 84 Second, the first builder who files a complaint and
establishes entitlement is awarded the first remedy only185if the
property is located significantly within the growth area.
Third, plaintiffs establishing entitlement shall be awarded
builder's remedies based upon the date of the filing of the action
if the property is located significantly within a growth area. That
order, however, may be varied by the court based upon consideration of whether any project is clearly more likely to result in
actual construction, and whether any project is clearly more
suitable from a planning perspective. 88 Modification of the established priorities as a result of the potential for construction
or site suitability is appropriate only if reasonable persons could
not disagree that the order should be adjusted. 87 Lastly, if the
award of additional builder's remedies is required to satisfy the
community's fair share obligation, parcels in limited growth areas which have satisfied the threshold test of entitlement shall
be considered in the same manner as step three above.'8 8 Because environmental and planning constraints are more imperative in limited growth areas, the third prong of the entitlement
test may often preclude the use of limited growth parcels. 8 9
Utilization of such parcels constitutes a recognition that the
SDGP designation of land is not necessarily sufficient to justify
the denial of a builder's remedy.
The court rejected the arguments of the plaintiffs that all
builders who have established entitlement should receive a
builder's remedy even if the municipality's fair share has been
exceeded. The "priority arrangement adopted here assumes that
no municipality shall be called upon to absorb more than the
fair share emanating from the methodology the supreme court
utilizes."' 90 The exposure to multiple builder's remedies, how-

184. J. W. Field Co., 204 N.J. Super. at 460-61, 499 A.2d 259. A plaintiff joined only
for the purposes of participating in a court ordered revision of a noncomplaint ordinance
would not participate in that portion of the trial in which noncompliance is demonstrated. Id. at 461, 499 A.2d at 259. A plaintiff in such a partially consolidated trial will
not be entitled to participate in the prioritization process. Id. at 460, 499 A.2d at 259.
185. Id. at 460, 499 A.2d at 259.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 462, 464, 499 A.2d at 260, 261.
188. Id. at 460, 464-65, 499 A.2d at 259, 261.
189. Id. at 465, 499 A.2d at 261.
190. Id. at 466, 499 A.2d at 262.
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ever, will encourage voluntary municipal compliance with Mount
Laurel II.
In Orgo Farms & Greenhouses, Inc. v. Township of Colts
Neck,1 91 (Orgo Farms II) the court addressed the third prong of
the entitlement analysis, the suitability of development. Initially, Judge Serpentelli rejected an attack on the continued viability of the SDGP "limited growth" designation of the land in
question. Although the supreme court in Mount Laurel II premised the continued viability of the SDGP designations upon its
belief that the plan should be revised no later than January 1,
1985,192 in the absence of evidence demonstrating a significant
modification in land use development patterns in the municipality since the promulgation of the SDGP, the court continued to
utilize its designations. "The fact that January 1, 1985 has come
and gone without the preparation of a new SDGP should not
cause the court to throw planning to the wind by allowing this
predominantly undeveloped community to experience large scale
development in the middle of an essentially rural farm area. '"193
The rationale for the Mount Laurel H decision, "one of the foremost judicial statements of concern for the protection of the environment and the preservation of natural resources. .. did not
evaporate on January 1, 1985."'"
Finding that Mount Laurel should not encourage inefficient
use of resources, 95 the court determined that the proposed project at the subject parcel was contrary to sound land use planning and failed to satisfy the third prong of the entitlement test.
The developer was not, therefore, entitled to a builder's remedy.
The parcel, located in the center of a large limited growth
area, 9 6 was distant from waterlines and other infrastructure, 197
and the proposed one thousand dwelling unit development, hotel, and commercial area would negatively impact the adjacent

191. Orgo Farms & Greenhouse, Inc. v. Township of Colts Neck, 204 N.J. Super.
585, 499 A.2d 565 (1985).
192. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 242, 456 A.2d at 432-33.
193. Orgo Farms & Greenhouse, 204 N.J. Super. at 589-90, 499 A.2d at 567.
194. Id. at 590, 499 A.2d at 567.
195. Id. at 592, 499 A.2d at 568.
196. Id. at 589, 592, 499 A.2d at 566, 568.
197. Id. at 590-91, 499 A.2d at 567. In order to connect the property to the public
water system, 3.7 miles of waterline was required to be installed. Id.
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farm uses.' 9
The court rejected Orgo's equity arguments that it is entitled to a builder's remedy because it had diligently pursued the
litigation for seven years, finding that any sophisticated land developer realizes that zoning litigation is a "risky business."199
Orgo also asserted that the SDGP designation should not affect
its rights because the SDGP was not part of the Mount Laurel
doctrine when the action was commenced, and because the
SDGP was not revised. The court, however, determined that
limited growth classification of the land alone was not the basis
for the finding that the property was unsuitable. The facts, however, which formed the basis for the classification remained constant even if the classification itself was not to be given the same
legal weight. 0 0
Lastly, the court found that the issue of whether another
competing site would be developed was irrelevant at this stage
''
- "comparative suitability of the two tracts is not the issue. 120
The question was solely whether either or both of the tracts
were suitable for Mount Laurel construction. Not until the compliance stage would the court examine in depth whether the
other parcel presents a realistic opportunity for the construction
of lower income housing within the time to be required by the
court. o
H.

Compliance Analysis

In Allan-Deane Corp. v. Township of Bedminster,'"° the issue presented to the court was whether the Township had
adopted a compliance ordinance that provided a realistic opportunity for the actual construction of its fair share of low and
moderate income housing, and whether it had satisfied any
builder's remedies which might have been earned. Although all

198. Id. The court found that "no amount of innovative planning, buffering or other
devices can take away the potential for the disruption of the existing land use pattern in
that area." Id. at 591, 499 A.2d at 567-68.
199. Id. at 593, 499 A.2d at 568.
200. Id. at 593, 499 A.2d at 569.
201. Id. at 594, 499 A.2d at 569.
202. Id. at 593-94, 499 A.2d at 569.
203. Allan-Deane Corp. v. Township of Bedminster, 205 N.J. Super. 87, 500 A.2d 49
(1985).
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of the parties agreed that the Township's fair share was 819
units pursuant to the AMG methodology, the Township sought
either to have the number reduced as a result of its voluntary
compliance with Mount Laurel II, or court authorization to
phase-in the units by requiring that only 656 units be constructed by the end of the decade with the remainder to be built
thereafter.
It has been the policy of the Serpentelli court to permit
modifications of the fair share number produced by the AMG
methodology when a municipality has stipulated noncompliance
and fair share at an early stage of the litigation, or has sought
declaratory relief before litigation was instituted against it, and
has in either case agreed to comply within a specified period of
time.20 " The court noted that similar adjustments in the fair
share number may be made in cases in which equity dictates
such an approach. 20 5 Among the justifications noted by the court
for such flexibility is the fact that the AMG methodology is not
scientifically precise, and merely represents the initial evolutionary stage of the development of a fair share methodology.0 8 Second, flexibility in determining a municipality's fair share constitutes an incentive for voluntary compliance.2 7 Third, to the
extent that the court's flexibility stimulates voluntary compliance, one of the key considerations of Mount Laurel will be satisfied - more housing will be constructed in a shorter period of

time.208
The court determined that the circumstances which authorize fair share flexibility did not exist in the Allan-Deane case
because the settlement did not occur until more than one year
after the matter was remanded for proceedings in accordance
with the Mount Laurel H decision, more than eighteen months
after the Mount Laurel II decision, and not until settlement was
directed within thirty days or a trial would be held concerning
the awarding of builder's remedies. 0 9
All parties to the controversy agreed that the court had the
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. at 106, 500 A.2d at 58.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 106-07, 500 A.2d at 58.
Id. at 107, 500 A.2d at 59.
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authority to cushion the impact of Mount Laurel development
on a municipality where the impact would cause "sudden and
radical transformation[s]. 11 0 Numbers alone, however, cannot
justify a finding of radical transformation." Fair share compliance programs which use the generally accepted mandatory setaside of four market units to one lower income unit, for example,
will necessarily produce high growth percentages. 2 Moreover,
absent specific information concerning the actual impact on a
community, growth rate comparisons have limited value. That
does not mean to say that the court considers such statistics to
be worthless - they provide some general guidance to the court
in assessing projected growth rates. 1 3
The authority to phase-in development as the result of radical transformation of a community is only to be exercised sparingly so as not to dilute the Mount Laurel obligation. 214 Although Mount Laurel H does not define radical transformation,
the court viewed the term in its common sense connotation, that
is, "a rapid and extreme change in existing conditions."21 5 In
measuring the capacity of a municipality to absorb such change
in a specified period of time, the court must examine the extent
of required capital improvements, institutional and service demands, and unique environmental and planning concerns which
might render a community particularly sensitive to sudden
growth.21 6 The court rejected arguments that a municipality is
precluded from raising a defense of radical transformation as a
consequence of past failures to accommodate growth.2 1 7 The
court additionally rejected the argument that radical transformation had been intensified by Bedminster's choice of its means
of compliance by the construction of four market units for each
unit of lower income housing.2 8

210. Id. (quoting Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 280, 456 A.2d at 452-53).
211. Allan-Deane Corp., 205 N.J. Super. at 109, 500 A.2d at 60.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 109-10, 500 A.2d at 60.
214. Id. at 110, 500 A.2d at 60 (citing Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. 158, 219, 456 A.2d
390, 420).
215. Allan-Deane Corp., 205 N.J. Super. at 111, 500 A.2d at 61.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 110, 500 A.2d at 60.
218. Id. at 110-11, 500 A.2d at 60. Although the court held that the argument "does
not carry the day at this point . . . it may have considerable weight in the future as
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Noting that the infrastructure of the Township is extremely
limited, its school system compatible with its small size and its
municipal service structure very limited, the court concluded
that its rural character had not changed significantly in many
years and that the fulfillment of its full fair share in this decade
would work a radical transformation in the Township.21 9 Accordingly, the court determined that the Township was required to
provide 656 of the units on or before December 31, 1990, with
the remaining 163 units to be provided by December 31, 1994.220
To determine whether an ordinance complies with the
Mount Laurel H mandate that a municipality must provide a
realistic opportunity for the construction of its fair share of low
income housing, the court devised a three step review to determine if such "likelihood" has been achieved.22 1 Initially, it must
be determined whether the municipality's ordinances are free
from all excessive restrictions and exactions or other cost generating devices that are not necessary to protect health and
safety.2 22 Second, the court must examine the sites selected or
other mechanisms used to achieve compliance to ascertain the
likelihood of actual construction within the compliance pe224
riod.223 Such review may involve evaluation of site suitability,
affirmative measures to encourage low cost housing,2 25 alternative compliance mechanisms, 2 26 project feasibility, 227 and any in-

acceptable and realistic alternative modes of compliance are developed." Id. at 111, 500
A.2d at 61.
219. Id. at 112, 500 A.2d at 61.
220. Id. The court emphasized that the 163 unit deferred portion of the 1980-1990
obligation is in addition to any fair share obligation which the Township is determined
to have for the 1990-2000 decade. Id.
221. Id. at 113, 500 A.2d at 62.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. A review of site suitability relates to the physical appropriateness of the property. Among the relevant factors in such inquiry are: environmental suitability, availability of infrastructure, proximity to goods and services, regional accessibility and compatibility with neighboring land uses. Id. at 115, 500 A.2d at 63.
225. A review of affirmative measures includes examination of subsidies, inclusionary zoning devices, incentive zoning, mandatory set-asides and resale controls necessary
to ensure that lower income units will remain affordable. Id.
226. Alternate compliance mechanisms are those by which a municipality may avoid
20"(" mandatory set-aside construction of four market units for each lower income unit,
such as commercial incentive zoning which includes lower income housing or projects
funded by the municipality. Id.
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tangibles which may affect the likelihood of development. The
mere revision of a zoning ordinance to provide for Mount Laurel
housing does not guarantee that such housing will actually be
constructed. The court must, accordingly, ascertain whether
there are any hidden factors in the compliance package which
would impair the likelihood of development. Such factors include: individual predilections of property owners, political pressures not to sell, title problems, vested approvals for other uses
and the inflation of market prices as a result of Mount Laurel
rezoning.2 2 Lastly, if the sites selected or other mechanisms utilized are realistic, then the court will approve the compliance
package." 9
The court affirmed that it is not its function to substitute
its judgment for that of a municipality, absent entitlement to a
builder's remedy, when a reasonable compliance package is offered by a municipality, although a number of equally reasonable alternatives are presented. 3 0 Accordingly, in its examination
of a proposed compliance package, the court will not review
other sites or mechanisms which may be asserted to be more
likely to produce Mount Laurel construction. In the opinion of
the court, the owner of property excluded from a community's
compliance package has not been treated unfairly because
"Mount Laurel principles exist for the benefit of the lower income households of our state [New Jersey], not for those seeking
''23 1

rezoning.

In addition to the requirement that each site must be realistic, the court emphasized that the total package must demon-

227. Project feasibility relates to whether the rezoning and other affirmative measures will result in sufficient profit to make a project a likelihood. The court will review
any density bonuses granted as the result of mandatory set-asides to ascertain whether
sufficient funds will be generated to provide internal subsidies for the lower income
units. Construction will not occur if the set-asides are too high or the bonus too low. The
court must also review fee waivers, tax abatements and other municipal actions designed
to provide a builder with the assurance of a reasonable profit. Id. at 115-16, 500 A.2d at
63.
228. Id. at 116, 500 A.2d at 63.
229. Id. at 116-17, 500 A.2d at 63-64.
230. "[A] municipality is not required to replace its reasonable approach with another reasonable approach merely because a property owner or owners, not entitled to a
builder's remedy are excluded from the package or because it might have been just as
reasonable to include them." Id. at 132, 500 A.2d at 72.
231. Id. at 114, 500 A.2d at 62.
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strate reasonable planning. The fact that each site is realistic
does not compel the conclusion that the combination will automatically produce an acceptable compliance package. As an example, the court must ascertain that social segregation will not
232
result within individual projects or the community.
The court concluded that the subject ordinance eliminated
all unnecessary cost generating devices, provided sufficient affirmative measures,23 3 and created zoning for sites which were
likely to satisfy the Township's Mount Laurel obligation in a
timely manner.2 3 4 The court rejected the claims of a competing
property owner, Dobbs, that his property, excluded from the
compliance package, was more appropriate to provide Mount
Laurel housing and should, therefore, be substituted for other
included parcels. The court also rejected his claim of entitlement
to a builder's remedy since he did not intervene in the action
until after the ordinance had been found to be noncompliant.
Accordingly, he failed to satisfy the entitlement standard for two
reasons: he was not a Mount Laurel plaintiff, and he did not
cause the process leading to the acceptance of a compliance
2 35
ordinance.
In rejecting arguments that additional overzoning was required, in order to guarantee that the initial phase of the Township's fair share would be satisfied, the court noted that overzoning is not mandated in all cases and should, if required, be
directly related to the likelihood of construction of compliance
sites. 236 Given the "greater assurance of compliance than is
available in the typical case," the court declined to require excessive overzoning in the initial phase which might serve to generate unnecessary growth.23 7 The court also refused to order
"substantial overzoning" for the deferred obligation at the time
of the decision, preferring to assess the need therefor at the time
232. Id. at 116-17, 500 A.2d at 63-64.
233. The affirmative measures utilized by Bedminster included: waiver of certain
application fees; adoption of a resolution of need; ratification of a tax abatement agreement; assistance to developer in obtaining financing; contributions to defray administrative expenses of nonprofit corporations to maintain the price structure of lower income
units and upgrading of sewer facilities. Id. at 117-18, 500 A.2d at 64.
234. Id. at 136, 500 A.2d at 74.
235. Id. at 138, 500 A.2d at 75.
236. Id. at 144, 500 A.2d at 78.
237. Id.
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of the calculation of the 1990-2000 fair share.2 38
Lastly, Dobbs asserted that a portion of the Mount Laurel
units under construction did not satisfy the affordability criteria
of Mount Laurel I. The court found that the units could be
purchased by lower income families who would not be required
to utilize more than twenty-eight percent of their gross income
for payments of principal, interest, taxes, insurance and condominium fees, the standard widely accepted in Mount Laurel
litigation. 39
I.

Fair Housing Act

Responding to Mount Laurel II's invitation for legislative
action2 40 and to the unpopular reaction to Mount Laurel II, the
New Jersey Legislature approved the Fair Housing Act 41 in
1985 providing an administrative mechanism for assuring compliance with the constitutional mandates of Mount Laurel II.
The measure indicated the Legislature's preference for the resolution of Mount Laurel claims by means of mediation, not litigation.242 The legislation reflects a desire to provide low and moderate cost housing in accordance with sound planning concepts
243
and regional need.
The Act provides for the creation of the Council on Affordable Housing 244 whose duties include: the determination of housing regions, estimation of present and prospective need for low
and moderate income housing, and the adoption of guidelines so
that municipalities may determine their present and prospective
fair share of the housing need for its region. 24 1 The Council's
mandate is the "administration of housing obligations in accordance with sound regional planning considerations .... ",248 A

238. Id. at 145, 500 A.2d at 79.
239. Id. at 146, 500 A.2d at 79.
240. Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 212-14, 456 A.2d at 417.
241. 1985 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 222 (West).
242. Id. at § 3.
243. Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Fair
Housing Act in The Hills Development Co. v. Township of Bernards, No. A-122-85 (N.J.
Sup. Ct. Feb. 20, 1986).
244. 1985 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 222 (West) at § 5.
245. Id. at § 7.
246. Id. at § 4(a).
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community may elect to submit a "housing element" plan to the
Council which must be designed to "meet present and prospective housing needs, with particular attention to low and moderate income housing .... "247 A municipality may utilize any technique in the preparation of its housing element which provides a
realistic opportunity for the provision of its fair share, including:
rezoning to provide economic viability of a development by providing sufficient densities through mandatory set-asides or density bonuses, tax abatements, infrastructure expansion and reha24 8
bilitation, and the utilization of municipality-generated funds.
A municipality may petition the Council for substantive certification of its housing element, or commence a declaratory judgment action within six years after the submission of its housing
element.2 9 If no objection is filed with the Council within fortyfive days after notice of the submission, the Council must issue
substantial certification, and the municipality is permitted fortyfive days within which to adopt its fair share housing ordinance. 250 If an objection is filed to a petition for housing certification, the Council is required to mediate the dispute. If the mediation is unsuccessful, a factual hearing is required to be held
before an administrative law judge.2 5
Any Mount Laurel litigation instituted less than sixty days
before the effective date of the Act or thereafter must utilize its
administrative provisions if the defendant-municipality so
elects. Any exclusionary zoning cases instituted more than sixty
days before the Act's effective date may, at the discretion of the
trial court, be transferred to the Council. In determining such
application, the court is required to consider whether a transfer
of the action "would result in a manifest injustice to any party
to the litigation."25 2
In a sharp departure from the Mount Laurel II decision,
247. Id. at §§ 9-10.
248. Id. at § 11.
249. Id. at § 13.
250. Id. at § 14. Prior to issuance of a substantive certification, the Council must
find that the fair share plan is consistent with the Council's rules, is not inconsistent
with achievement of the low and moderate income housing need of the region, and that
the achievement of the municipality's fair share is realistically possible by virtue of the
elimination of cost generating regulations and affirmative measures. Id.
251. Id. at §§ 15(a)-(c).

252. Id. at § 16.
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the Act prohibits the award of a builder's remedy for all suits
filed after January 30, 1983.2 53 The legislation also authorizes
the phasing-in of a municiplity's fair share obligation with respect to any municipality which has an action pending or a judgment entered against it after the Act's effective date,254 or which
had a judgment entered against it prior to the effective date and
from which an appeal is pending, or which has instituted an action for a declaratory judgment pursuant to the Act's
provisions. 55
The fair share ordinance of any municipality which has
been certified by the Council is considered to be presumptively
valid in any subsequent exclusionary zoning action filed against
the municipality and the party seeking to rebut that presumption is required to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence
that the housing element and ordinances do not provide a realistic opportunity for the provision of the municipality's fair
share.2 56
The Fair Housing Act varies a number of the definitions
formulated by the Mount Laurel trial judges which may significantly affect a municipality's fair share number. A "housing region" is defined to be "a geographic area of no less than two nor
more than four contiguous, whole counties which exhibit significant social, economic and income similarities, and which constitute to the greatest extent practicable the primary metropolitan
statistical areas" of the Census Bureau.2 57 "Prospective need" is
considered to be "a projection of housing needs based on development and growth which is reasonably likely to occur in a region or a municipality, as the case may be as a result of actual
determination of public and private entities."2 8'

253. Id. at § 28.
254. July 2, 1985. 1985 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 222 (West).
255. 1985 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 222 (West) at § 23(a).
256. Id. at § 17(a).
257. Id. at § 4(b).
258. Id. at § 4(j).
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III. New York
A.

The Berenson Doctrine

New York courts have maintained a far more conservative
perspective of the issue of exclusionary zoning. 59 InBerenson v.
Town of New Castle, s0 the court of appeals enunciated a two
part test to examine the validity of an ordinance challenged as
exclusionary: First, whether the municipality has provided a
properly balanced and well ordered plan for the community.
Second, whether consideration was given to the present and future housing requirements of the region.261 With respect to the
first portion of the analysis, the court observed that what may
be appropriate for one community may differ substantially from
what is appropriate for another. Recognizing that such differences exist between communities, the court stated that although
"it may be impermissible in an undeveloped community to prevent entirely the construction of multiple-family residences anywhere in the locality ... it is perfectly acceptable to limit new
"2
construction of such buildings where such units already exist.'

Accordingly, a trial court must ascertain what types of housing
exist in a municipality, their quantity and quality, whether the
supply satisfies the present needs of the community, whether
new construction is required to fulfill the future requirements of
the municipality, and, if so, the form of such new development.
Although zoning has traditionally been considered to affect
only land within the community, zoning activities have a substantial impact beyond the borders of the municipality. Accordingly, in examining whether a community has considered regional needs, "there must be a balancing of the local desire to
maintain the status quo within the community and the greater
public interest that regional needs be met."2 63 If the regional

and local need for such housing is met by the local community
259. See Nolon, Exclusionary Zoning: New York, New Jersey Cases Compared,
N.Y.L.J., July 2, 1985, at 1, col. 1 and N.Y.L.J., July 22, 1985, at 1, col. 1, for a comparison of the key points of the Mount Laurel decision and the Berenson-Blitz decisions.
260. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d' 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d
672 (1975).
261. Id. at 110, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 680-81.
262. Id. at 110, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
263. Id. at 110, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
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or by other accessible areas in the community at large, an ordinance may not be held to be invalid on its face. The court observed, however, that since zoning is essentially a legislative act:
[I]t is quite anomalous that a court should be required to perform
the tasks of a regional planner. To that end, we look to the Legislature to make appropriate changes in order to foster the development of programs designed to achieve sound regional planning.
While the people of New Castle may fervently desire to be left
alone by the forces of change, the ultimate determination is not
solely theirs. 64
2 65
In Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. v. Village of Upper Brookville,
the court of appeals found an ordinance which zoned certain areas of a village for a minimum lot area of five acres to be valid.
While emphasizing that it would not "countenance community
efforts at exclusion under any guise,"'2 6 large-lot zoning is, under
appropriate circumstances, a legitimate means to advance the
public welfare of preservation of open spaces and the protection
of the ill-effects of urbanization. The decision added an additional basis upon which a zoning ordinance could be found to be
invalid, that is, if it is enacted for an improper purpose. As a
result, "[o]nce an exclusionary effect coupled with a failure to
balance the local desires with housing needs has been proved,
then the burden of otherwise justifying the ordinance shifts to
' 2 67
the defendant.
In Blitz v. Town of New Castle,6 8 the second department
rejected the contention that zoning ordinances must affirmatively provide for the creation of all necessary housing and observed that "New York courts have consistently rejected any
'fair share' doctrine which would impose specific unit goals or
quotas of housing on a municipality ....
29 Instead, the Blitz
court determined that it should examine certain "relevant data
which may indicate whether New Castle's provisions for housing
are at all commensurate with some general notion of its ex264. Id. at 111, 341 N.E.2d at 243, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 682.
265. Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. v. Village of Upper Brookville, 51 N.Y.2d 338, 414
N.E.2d 680, 434 N.Y.S.2d 180, cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1042 (1980).
266. Id. at 344-45, 341 N.E.2d at 683, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
267. Id. at 345, 341 N.E.2d at 683-84, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
268. Blitz v. Town of New Castle, 94 A.D.2d 92, 463 N.Y.S.2d 832 (2d Dep't 1983).
269. Id. at 98, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 836.
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pected contribution to the regional housing need. ' 17 0 In calculating the housing needs of the region the court considered the report of a blue ribbon committee which was adopted by the
county legislature as the county housing policy to be "the best
possible estimate of the housing needs of Westchester County
for the coming decade and that as a legislative finding it is enti'271
tled to great weight and the presumption of validity.
The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that it is the
number of housing units that will actually or probably be built
that is determinative of whether the second portion of the Berenson analysis has been satisfied and determined that the
proper focus of its inquiry is limited to whether the ordinance
allows the development of sufficient housing to satisfy any reasonable estimate of the town's proportionate anticipated contribution. The court reaffirmed the holding of Berenson that affirmative action is not required:
[Z]oning ordinances will go no further than determining what
may or may not be built; market forces will decide what will actually be built,... our concern is to determine whether, on its face,
the amended ordinance will allow the construction of sufficient
housing to meet the town's share of the region's housing needs,
particularly for multifamily housing, assuming that such construction be both physically and economically feasible.2 72
The controversy remained fairly static in New York until
the law enunciated in the 1983 Mount Laurel II decision began
to be asserted in New York land use controversies. In Suffolk
Housing Services v. Town of Brookhaven,' 73 the second department in 1985 declined to "work a change of historic proportions
in the development of New York zoning law, 2 74 and determined
that the Mount Laurel decisions' requirement of a constitutional
obligation on the part of municipalities to zone for low and moderate income housing is inapplicable in New York. The plaintiffs
alleged that the town, through its zoning ordinance, policies and

270. Id.
271. Id. at 98, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
272. Id. at 99, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 836.
273. Suffolk Housing Services v. Town of Brookhaven, 109 A.D.2d 323, 491 N.Y.S.2d
396 (2d Dep't 1985).
274. Id. at 332, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
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practices, had prevented the development of sufficient housing
to accommodate its low-to-moderate income population. Utilizing the Berenson test, the court found that the ordinance, by
virtue of its wide variety of different types and densities of residential housing, provided a properly balanced and well ordered
plan for the community, and satisfied the first prong of that
analysis.2 75 Because the multi-family housing which was permitted in numerous zones required the issuance of a special permit,
the court was required to examine the town's actions in order to
determine whether the special permit provisions had been applied in a manner which allows for the construction of different
types of housing, or was merely subterfuge to impress the courts.
Reviewing the statistics of permits granted, the court concluded
that the procedure had not been employed as a ruse to prevent
the construction of multi-family housing.
With respect to the question of satisfaction of regional
housing needs, the court found that Berenson "merely requires
that a town allow for the construction of different types of housing in sufficient numbers for those people who want and can afford it."2 76 The court reiterated its holding in Blitz that its review was limited to whether the ordinance allows the
construction of sufficient housing to meet the municipality's
share of the regional need, assuming that the construction of the
units is both physically and economically feasible. The appellate
division repudiated the contention that a balanced and well-ordered community requires an array of housing sufficient to meet
the legitimate needs of all the town's residents and others at
prices they can afford.2 77 The court noted that Berenson approached the problem of exclusionary zoning solely in terms of
traditional zoning and planning considerations, and did not address how such housing would be built, affordability, subsidies,
"nor does it purport to mandate that a zoning ordinance make it
possible for people of all classes to live in a given community. It
merely requires that a town allow for the construction of different types of housing in sufficient numbers for those people who

275. Id. at 328-29, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 400.
276. Id. at 331, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
277. Id.
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In affirming the validity of the town's

ordinance, the court noted that the court of appeals has not announced a constitutional obligation on the part of municipalities
to zone for low-to-moderate income housing. 7 9
The court in Asian American for Equality v. Koch,280 specifically declined to follow the second department's unambiguous rejection of the Mount Laurel principles and held that "it is
now appropriate to adopt the Mount Laurel Doctrine as the law
of New York.

21 8 1

In Asian American for Equality, the plaintiffs

challenged New York City's creation of a Special Manhattan
Bridge District, alleging that it constituted a plan of neighborhood gentrification in order to exclude and displace low-income
Chinese persons from Chinatown and New York City in favor of
upper-income individuals. Recognizing a severe housing shortage
in the area, the city devised an incentive program to promote
residential development, relying primarily upon floor area bonuses to developers who provide certain community facilities,
such as community space, rehabilitation of existing housing and
subsidized housing. The approval which stimulated the proceeding was the granting of a special permit for the construction of a
twenty-one story building containing eighty-seven condominium
units ranging in price from $170,000 to $500,000. In order to obtain a floor area bonus, the developer agreed to construct a pool
on the premises to be conveyed to the YMCA and to contribute
$500,000 for the rehabilitation of subsidy housing.
The court observed that New York's attempts to satisfy the
need for adequate housing for low-and-middle income individuals, by focusing on whether there exists a properly balanced and
well ordered plan for the development of the community, has
not resulted in the construction of such housing. The court
found that "[t]he underpinnings of the Mount Laurel Doctrine
and the Berenson doctrine are the same,

2 82

that is, that the po-

lice power delegation to zone must be exercised for the general
welfare of all citizens. The court denied the City's motion to dis-

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Id.
Id.
Asian American for Equality v. Koch, 129 Misc. 2d 67, 492 N.Y.S.2d 837 (1985).
Id. at 82, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 848.
Id. at 81, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
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miss the complaint finding that a cause of action had been
stated under both the Mount Laurel and Berenson standards.
The history and social structure of Chinatown is such that
its residents, most of whom fall into the low-income category,
are deeply rooted into the community. It was asserted that the
displacement of these residents by the implementation of zoning
schemes would be so traumatic, that it would preclude any reasonable opportunity for the future development of low-andmoderate income housing in Chinatown. 83 Thus, although the
zoning scheme was designed to aid Chinatown's low-income residents, it would, in essence, be contrary to their general welfare.
The court held that if the plaintiffs are able to prove that the
amendment would lead to unwarranted displacements, and that
it circumvents the City's obligation to affirmatively provide a realistic opportunity for the construction of low-income housing,
plaintiffs may prevail at trial.2 8' "[T]he zoning power is no more
abused by keeping out the region's poor than by forcing out the
resident poor. 2 8 5 The court rejected the City's argument that
the provision of incentive bonuses in the amendment required a
holding that it is valid as a matter of law. The Mount Laurel H
court determined that there may be instances when incentive
devices alone may not be sufficient, and that more extensive
measures may be required. Accordingly, the court determined
that the issue must be explored at trial. 8 6
Additionally, the court found that a cause of action under
the Berenson analysis was stated by the allegations: that the
amendment ignored the critical need for low-income housing
and would, instead, result only in luxury housing, thereby violating the constitutional mandate that the police power be utilized
only in furtherance of the public welfare; and that it does not
constitute a well-balanced plan. 8 7 The court held that although
a particular quantitative proportion of various types of housing
is not required by Berenson, the particular needs of Chinatown

283. Id. at 83-85, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 848-49.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 83, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 848 (quoting Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 214, 456
A.2d at 418).
286. Mount Laurel H, 92 N.J. 158, 266-67, 456 A.2d 390, 445-46 (1983).
287. Asian American for Equality v. Koch, 129 Misc. 2d at 85-86, 492 N.Y.S.2d at
849-50.
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may mandate that a well-balanced plan facilitate the construction of quality low-income housing.2 88 Accordingly, issues were
raised with respect to the first prong of the Berenson test which
required resolution at trial. Additionally, the trial court would
be required to explore whether the needs of the community can
be satisfied by neighboring communities, whether it would be
appropriate in view of the unique character of Chinatown, and
the possible effects that displacement would have on its
residents.2 8 9
Subsequently, the second department utilized the Berenson
analysis to determine that an ordinance which excluded multifamily housing for the elderly was not exclusionary. In North
Shore Unitarian Universalist Society v. Village of Upper
BrookviUle,290 the court first held that the plaintiffs had failed to
prove that the ordinance did not provide for the present and
future needs of the village's residents, that is, that it did not
constitute a properly balanced and well-ordered plan.29 1 With
respect to the second Berenson prong, the court relied upon the
Nassau-Suffolk Comprehensive Development Plan in determining whether the plaintiff proved the existence of a regional need
for high-density housing for the elderly, and whether such need
was adequately satisfied. The Plan did not designate any highdensity development for the village, but recommended low-density development to preserve the village's present open space.
Similarly, low-density development was recommended for the
village by a water management study which classified the area as
a primary source of drinking water for both counties. Furthermore, the court found that the Plan provided for the development of sufficient housing elsewhere, and that the ordinance
served a regional need for open space and water preservation.
The court also rejected the contention that the ordinance is
insufficient because the Plan's projected number of apartments
had not been constructed.
[A] facially valid ordinance will not be invalidated simply be-

288. Id. at 88, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 851.
289. Id.
290. North Shore Unitarian Universalist Society v. Village of Upper Brookville, 110
A.D.2d 123, 493 N.Y.S.2d 564 (2d Dep't 1985).
291. Id. at 125-28, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 565-68.
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cause economic forces prevent construction of multi-family housing. Moreover, a requirement that those seeking to build either
multi-family housing or age-restricted multi-family housing must
first seek a permit to do so does not destroy the presumptive validity of zoning ordinances which do not premap to provide for
such housing.2 92

IV. Conclusion
Although there are a number of similarities between the
Mount Laurel decisions and the New York exclusionary zoning
cases, the distinctions are quite profound. Among the common
bases in both lines of decisions is the requirement that all zoning
regulations be in furtherance of the public welfare. As is evident,
however, the two states have interpreted the implications of that
mandate in a different manner.
Additionally, the placement of responsibility for the provision of low-cost housing in New Jersey and the placement of responsibility for the furtherance of regional planning in New
York has been placed in the legislature, not the courts. The
Mount Laurel II court recognized that:
[T]he matter is better left to the Legislature. We act first and
foremost because the Constitution of our State requires protection of the interests involved and because the Legislature has not
protected them .... So while we have always preferred legislative
to judicial action in this field, we shall continue - until the Legislature acts - to do our best to uphold the constitutional obligation
2 93
that underlies the Mount Laurel doctrine.
The Berenson court, on the other hand, looked to the New York
State Legislature to make appropriate changes in order to foster
the development, not of low-cost housing, but of sound regional
planning.
Of considerable importance in both instances is the reliance
upon regional planning studies. Mount Laurel, of course, is premised upon the utilization of the SDGP as a rational long-range
land use planning blueprint for future growth, and for the implementation of the Mount Laurel doctrine. Although the SDGP

292. Id. at 128, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
293. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 212, 456 A.2d at 417.
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has been criticized as "merely reflect[ing] present development
throughout the state, concentrating on 'what is' rather than
'what ought to be,' ,,294_ it is, at least, an attempt at rational
regional planning. Since the Berenson decision, New York courts
have, in fact, placed great reliance on various regional planning
documents which "illustrate the approach to regional zoning
problems which was favored in Berenson.' '295 In Blitz, for example, the court found that the County Board of Legislators responded to the Berenson call for legislative action by adopting
the report of a blue-ribbon committee, formed to study longrange land use planning as the Board's county housing policy.
Thus, the report and its finding of the regional housing need
gained further validity. 29" Similarly, in North Shore Unitarian
Universalist Society, the court, in order to examine whether a
regional need exists for multi-unit or high-density housing for
the elderly, and whether that need has been satisfied, accorded
great deference to the Nassau-Suffolk Comprehensive Develop7
ment Plan, and, to a lesser extent, a water management study. 29
Such presumptive validity to which planning studies are entitled
should serve as a great impetus for the preparation of reports.
Regardless of the underlying similarity of theory, Berenson
and its progeny and the Mount Laurel decisions exhibit many
distinctive features which distinguish the course of the judicial
determinations. First of all, while Mount Laurel has resulted in
a veritable revolution in New Jersey zoning planning and procedure, and has certainly increased the housing stock for the poor,
Berenson has had little effect in New York, with the possible
exception of the beleaguered Town of New Castle. While New
Jersey communities must provide for their fair share of housing
for the region's poor, New York municipalities need merely provide an array of housing as required by regional needs for those
who can afford such housing. Equally important, New York
courts have refused to adopt a fair share doctrine which would

294. Carton and Brown, An Open Letter to Municipalities, III New Jersey State
Bar Association, Land Use Section, No. 1, Aug. 1983.
295. Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. v. Village of Upper Brookville, 51 N.Y.2d at 347, 414
N.E.2d at 685, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 184.
296. Blitz v. Town of New Castle, 94 A.D.2d at 97, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
297. North Shore Unitarian Universalist Society, 110 A.D.2d at 126-28, 493
N.Y.S.2d at 566-67.
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impose specific unit goals or quotas of housing on a municipality, and have examined instead relevant data which may indicate whether a municipality's provisions for housing are commensurate with "some general notion" 9 8 of its expected
contribution to the regional housing need. No affirmative obligation is imposed to promote low-income housing. New Jersey
communities must satisfy their numerical fair share regardless of
bona fide efforts. New York municipalities, on the other hand,
need merely provide by their ordinances for the construction of
its share of the regional housing need. Moreover, unlike New
Jersey townships, New York municipalities are not required to
eliminate cost producing regulations which might not serve the
public interest.
Will the Mount Laurel doctrine become the law of New
York? There are a number of reasons why it is unlikely that
such an extreme position will be adopted by the New York
courts. It can safely be assumed, however, that the Mount Laurel decisions will continue to influence the manner in which the
courts view the issue of exclusionary zoning disputes. In the first
instance, Mount Laurel H was the result of the supreme court's
perception of "widespread non-compliance with the constitutional mandate"2 99 of Mount Laurel I on the part of New
Jersey's municipalities. The history of exclusionary zoning has
been far different in New York - invalidation of a zoning ordinance as a result of exclusionary zoning has been the rarest of
exceptions. Only in Berenson, when the doctrine of exclusionary
zoning was first announced, and in Asian American for Equality, an anomoly to date, have ordinances been declared invalid.
There has been no history of non-compliance with the less demanding Berenson standard. Moreover, the instances in which
New York courts have so pervasively intervened in the affairs of
a municipality are, indeed, rare. In the field of local zoning, it is
virtually unprecedented. Accordingly, the fashioning of such a
draconic remedy in New York is unwarranted.
Moreover, the wisdom and legitimacy of mandating that rational planning take a subservient position to a judicially created
constitutional right to low-cost housing is, at best, debatable. It

298. Blitz, 94 A.D.2d at 98, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 836.
299. Mount Laurel II, 92 N.J. at 199, 456 A.2d at 410.
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cannot be argued that fundamental fairness requires that a municipality not exclude multiple family housing where a regional
need for the same exists, and where valid planning considerations and criteria can be met. To require, however, that a municipality violate its own comprehensive plan and ignore valid zoning regulations, which had previously been considered to be
presumptively valid, defies logic. Further, the Berensen doctrine
certainly is more consistent with traditional notions of providing
a rational zoning scheme commensurate with the housing requirements of all segments of the regional community.
Although it cannot be doubted that a significant amount of
low and moderate income housing has and will result in New
Jersey as a result of Mount Laurel, the mandates of Mount Laurel may not be the most efficient means to create affordable
housing. "As paradoxical as it may seem, one of the most effective methods of undermining the goals of the Mount Laurel H
decision may be enthusiastic compliance by the municipality." 30 0
Under such a scenario, utilizing mandatory set asides and
overzoning, techniques favored by the New Jersey courts, a municipality could require a high number percentage of mandatory
301
set-asides in virtually all of its undeveloped residential land.
"This device will immediately discourage all development by
most small builders who do not want to get involved in the potential risk, prohibitive legal fees, and high administrative costs,
and unnececessary red tape incurred the implementation of an
affirmative measures program. 3 0 2 With respect to larger developments, the consequence of such over-enthusiastic compliance
would result in "severely limiting the economic feasibility and
diminishing, if not eliminating, any developer interest." 303 In
short, Mount Laurel will only be effective with respect to municipalities which react to its mandates in good faith and for developers who have the stamina to engage in time-consuming and
finance-depleting litigation.
It cannot be argued that a severe housing shortage does not
exist in New York for those of modest income, as well as for the
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rest of society. The Mount Laurel decisions are certainly having
an impact on how the New York courts view zoning ordinances
which fail to allow multiple family housing, particularly when
the poor are excluded from a community and when the less fortunate are displaced by housing for the well-to-do. It is equally
clear that the influence of Mount Laurel will continue to have
an impact on the law in New York, particularly since Berenson
has not produced additional housing for the poor and, in all likelihood, has not resulted in the construction of additional housing
of any nature, except in North Castle.
Utilization of Mount Laurel standards in New York would
prevent many municipalities from preserving the essential character of the community. As suburban sprawl continues to devour
open spaces and green areas, city dwellers continue to seek such
environments in which to raise families, and natives seek to perpetuate the remaining bucolic elements of the area. Perhaps,
what is needed is a mix of communities of varying characteristics to suit the needs and lifestyles of a diverse society, rather
than a wide variety of housing in every municipality, be it large
or small. Judicial intrusion into a community's development is
clearly a remedy of last resort. The type of comprehensive, rational planning illustrated in North Shore Unitarian Universalist Society may facilitate such intelligent location of denser development and preservation of green areas. New York should
not be permitted to drift in the direction of Mount Laurel as the
result of legislative default.
Promotion of purely parochial interests, on the other hand,
without any semblance of regional concern cannot serve the
public interest. Displacement of the poor to pursue gentrification, without efforts to accommodate the resultant homeless
must be considered to be the antithesis of sound planning, as
well as inhumane. The right of luxury urban development at
high density should entail the responsibility for those displaced.
Increased densities of market-rate units may provide the capital
to renovate dilapitated housing or to subsidize dwelling units.
The Mount Laurel trial court decisions discussed herein reflect a very concerted effort by the trial judges to bring rationality and certainty to an uncertain area in which experts can debate the wisdom of various methodologies far into the future.
The conclusion must be reached that a fair degree of caprice
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must exist in any method chosen. It is clear, however, that planners can construct a model which will bear some relationship to
reality. The trial court decisions reveal that after trial and error,
a system for allocation, however imprecise, can be implemented
which will determine need and allocate the same. The more serious question is whether such an obligation should be imposed,
entailing such intrusive interference with functions which have
traditionally been considered to be of local concern. The unpopularity of the Mount Laurel II decision in New Jersey suggests
that the public support for such a supposed constitutional right
and the concomitant remedies is clearly lacking. The Fair Housing Act was an effort to escape some of the more intrusive features of Mount Laurel litigation with the intention to "put the
power to determine housing needs back where it belongs-back
in the hands of local, elected officials." 30 " Moreover, Governor
Kean has proposed a constitutional amendment to eliminate the
Mount Laurel constitutional obligation to provide low and moderate income housing. Given New Jersey's attempts to circumvent the court mandated Mount Laurel obligation, it certainly
can be argued that other states can learn from New Jersey's experiences and attempt a different approach to satisfying the
housing needs of the citizens of the community and region.
If New Jersey is successful in abrogating the Mount Laurel
doctrine, the impact of Mount Laurel on land use planning will
not be significantly lessened. The determination of the existence
of such a constitutional right and the judicial administration of
Mount Laurel litigation should provide guidance to other jurisdictions in coping with that serious dilemma. Although it is recognized that strictly insular zoning must be a relic of the past,
the intrusive impact of Mount Laurel should be sought to be
avoided in the future.
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